An Executive Performance Account of Theory of Mind Expression

Theory of mind tasks have been correlated with executive function tasks in normal and pathological development. If the link between these two constructs is due to common processing demands, then that association should be affected by varying such demands. In addition, theory-theory and modularity-theory give two different accounts of failure on theory of mind tasks: failure of competence and failure of performance. One way to distinguish between these competing accounts is to try to verify if theory of mind competence can be seen earlier than when children begin to pass standard false belief tasks. Seventy-five children were administered standard theory of mind tasks, an executive functioning task, and a measure of verbal ability. As expected, theory of mind was significantly correlated with executive functioning (r = 0.29, p < 0.05). Forty-one of the original 75 children who had difficulty with the original theory of mind battery were then administered theory of mind tasks with decreased processing demands (pretend versions). Early competence in theory of mind was demonstrated, as the pretend versions were found to be easier than the original versions (Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test, z = -3.87, p < 0.001). Also, performance on the pretend tasks no longer significantly correlated with executive functioning (r = 0.12, p = 0.44). These results support a modular account of theory of mind development.