The following text is © 1997 Robert Wozniak. All hyperlinked text links to footnotes located at the bottom of the document.
Experimental and Comparative Roots of Early Behaviorism: An Introduction
Robert H. Wozniak
Bryn Mawr College
The rise of behaviorism is often portrayed as a revolution in method, and it many ways it was. When John Broadus Watson (1878-1958) ascended the speaker's platform at Columbia University in 1913 to present his famous "behaviorist manifesto,"  psychology was the science of mind, the core phenomena of mind were those of consciousness, and the method of choice for the analysis of consciousness was introspection by a trained observer under controlled conditions.
By 1938, a scant twenty-five years later, mainstream psychology was the science not of mind but of behavior, the core phenomena of behavior were those of learning and memory, and the methods of choice for the analysis of leaning and memory involved purely objective observations of behavioral data varying as a function of the experimental manipulation of stimulus conditions.  Introspection and interpretation in terms of consciousness had become anathema to many psychologists.
In his "manifesto," Watson had called for just such a change. "Psychology as the behaviorist views it," he argued, "is a purely objective experimental branch of natural science...(whose) theoretical goal is the prediction and control of behavior. Introspection forms no essential part of its methods, nor is the scientific value of its data dependent upon the readiness with which they lend themselves to interpretation in terms of consciousness." 
There is little doubt that Watson's call for an objective science of behavior -- radical as it was in its intent and flamboyant in its tone -- played an influential role in the behavioral revolution that ensued.  It is equally certain, however, that just as Watson was not the only important contributor to this shift,  the paper of 1913 was not the revolutionary moment that it is sometimes thought to be. By 1913, the study of human and animal behavior by means of purely objective methods under conditions of experimental manipulation and control of stimulus conditions had a forty year history.
Indeed, Watson was a "behavior man" long before he was a "behaviorist," and his "manifesto" was prompted at least in part by the striking contrast that he perceived between the objective nature of available behavioral methods and the then prevalent ideology of an introspective psychology defined as the science of consciousness. Watson's primary goal at Columbia was to provide a rationale for the legitimation of behavior methods that had long since been in use.
The aim of this volume is to document the early and continuing availability of objective methods for the study of behavior by bringing together twelve seminal contributions to the development of methodology in experimental and comparative psychology. The very first such studies date from the 1870s and were carried out on animals by Douglas Alexander Spalding (c.1840-1877) and on a human infant by Charles Darwin (1809-1882).
Douglas Spalding was born in London about 1840. Little is known about his early life beyond the fact that he lived near Aberdeen and somehow came to the notice of Alexander Bain who interceded with University authorities so that Spalding could attend courses in philosophy and literature without tuition. After a year, Spalding left Aberdeen for London where he completed training in the law and contracted tuberculosis. In a vain attempt to improve his health, he began to travel. In Avignon, he met John Stuart Mill and through Mill he came to know Lord and Lady Amberley. The Amberleys eventually succeeded in securing Spalding's services as tutor to their oldest child, and he remained with the family until 1876 when Lord Amberley died. Spalding then returned to the continent and in 1877, still a young man, he died of tuberculosis.
Much of what we know about the life of Douglas Spalding is due to the research of Philip Howard Gray, and Gray has provided the best summary of Spalding's remarkable achievements:
"Spalding demonstrated that animals could be studied by the isolation and control of the antecedent conditions of their lives. The concepts of behavioral maturation and behavioral critical periods were invented by him...In a manner that few of his successors appreciated, he recognized the importance and interaction of both learned and instinctive behavior. He was the first to study the phenomenon which we now call imprinting; he began the study of anti-predator reactions; he experimented with both visual and auditory releasers;...he set out the logic of comparing the behavior of species born in different developmental stages; and he discovered, several years before Ebbinghaus, the rapidity with which unpracticed learnings disappear from the organism's behavior...he was the first man to use the word behavior in its present psychological sense...systematized the experimental method in the study of behavior, and by showing how behavior could be controlled and manipulated he began an experimental science which was carried forward by...innumerable later investigators who have long since forgotten, or never knew, how their science was begun."
Although any of Spalding's empirical papers could have been included in this volume, we have chosen to reprint "Instinct. With Original Observations on Young Animals." With the exception of a short note that appeared in  1872,  this is Spalding's first research report, and it must be read to be appreciated for its systematicity and ingenuity of approach and attention to behavioral detail.
Charles Darwin, author of the Origin of Species  and the Descent of Man,  is far too well-known to require introduction. His "Biographical Sketch of an Infant," which appeared in Mind in 1877, is similarly and justifiably renowned. Based on 1840 diary observations of the behavior of his own child, Darwin's "Biographical Sketch" exhibits the same extraordinary attention to the detail of infant behavior that Spalding gave to that of young animals.
As with Spalding, Darwin also went beyond simple observation to vary the conditions of stimulation and observe concomitant variation in behavior. Thus, for example, in discussing the startle reaction, Darwin tells us that when his son was "114 days old, I shook a paste-board box with comfits in it near his face and he started, whilst the same box when empty or any other object shaken as near or much nearer to his face produced no effect." 
Although objective in their observations and experimental in their variation of the conditions of behavior, neither Spalding nor Darwin were much inclined toward either the design of apparatus to control the animal's reaction or the quantification of response. One of the first to introduce apparatus and quantification into the study of animal behavior was Sir John Lubbock (1834-1913), the fourth baronet and first Baron Avebury. Lubbock was born in London, the eldest son of a distinguished banker who served for many years as treasurer of the Royal Society. It was at the family's country home, High Elms, Down, Kent, that Lubbock was introduced to natural history, especially through the efforts of Charles Darwin, a friend of the family who came to live at Down when Lubbock was only seven years old.
By occupation a banker as his father had been before him, and by inclination a public figure who spent time in parliament, Lubbock's pursuit of natural science and scientific writing was limited to the hours of his leisure. Nonetheless he managed to publish over a dozen books, several of which report his observations of animal behavior. Of these, Ants, Bees, and Wasps. A Record of Observations on the Habits of the Social Hymenoptera, first published in 1882 and later reprinted many times, is possibly the most remarkable.
In this extraordinary book, the most important chapter is that which we have reprinted here, "General Intelligence, and Power of Finding Their Way." In this chapter Lubbock took a number of critical steps away from the natural history approach of Spalding and Darwin -- objective and systematic as it was -- and toward the modern animal laboratory. His first innovation was to provide precise, detailed, quantitative descriptions of the conditions of observation, not much different from those one would find in the methods section of a modern journal article. His second innovation was to report actual data in the body of his text and to use this data to compute simple summary statistics. For example, in observing ants learning to take an experimentally contrived route between food and the nest, Lubbock measured time and distance and calculated their pace at about "6 feet in a minute."
These advances in methodology would alone have earned him a place in the history of objective method, but Lubbock employed two additional techniques of even greater importance for future research. Following his ants with a pencil as they pursued their way, Lubbock made and, in his text reproduced, detailed tracings of the ants' paths. This is certainly one of the first attempts to make an analogue record of behavior for later coding. Second, and most importantly, to observe the progress made by his ants in learning to follow a new path from food to nest, Lubbock designed, built, and employed a number of simple pieces of apparatus that constrained the ants' movements. These pieces of apparatus were, in effect, the first animal mazes. 
Between 1882 and 1894, the canons of adequate behavioral method continued to evolve. By the time that James Mark Baldwin (1861-1934) published his classic study of infant behavioral development, "The Origin of Right-Handedness,"  the use of apparatus for the measurement of behavior and registration of behavioral data was commonplace. Issues of experimental control, research design, and quantification had become paramount.
Although Baldwin is probably best known for concepts -- "assimilation," "accommodation," "primary circular reaction," "genetic logic," and "genetic epistemology" -- that directly influenced the young Jean Piaget (1896-1980), he was one of the first generation of American experimentalists to be trained in Europe. He was a founder of the Psychological Review, established laboratories at the University of Toronto and Princeton, and reestablished the lapsed laboratory of G. Stanley Hall (1844-1924) at Johns Hopkins before drifting away from experimental work toward theoretical psychology. 
In 1889 in order to study the "actual conditions of the rise of 'dextrality,'"  Baldwin began to observe his elder daughter in a long series of reaching experiments that extended from her fourth to her tenth month. Objects and colors were placed in front of the infant "in positions exactly determined and recorded by a simple arrangement of sliding rods." To minimize unwanted sources of variability and rule out inadvertent bias,
"The experiments took place at the same hour daily...(and) certain precautions were carefully enforced. She [Baldwin's daughter Helen] was never carried about in arms at all -- never walked with when crying or sleepless...; she was frequently turned over in her sleep; she was not allowed to balance herself on her feet until a later period than that covered by the experiments." 
In addition to these precautions, the objects and colors toward which the baby was allowed to reach, as well as their distance and direction from her body, were all systematically varied, and midway through each series of experiments, the child's position at the table was reversed. Finally, when Baldwin presented his data, he did so in quantitative, tabular form.
While Baldwin's results are interesting and important, especially the early appearance of laterality only when the child had to strain for an object beyond easy reach, what is most striking about this research is its thoroughgoing objectivism. Not only did Baldwin employ methods that were experimental, controlled, and quantitative, he did so in the context of explicit concern for issues of experimental design and with an exclusive focus on the development of a particular kind of behavior.
While Lubbock and Baldwin used laboratory-like procedures in the objective study of behavior, neither did so within the laboratory. Lubbock worked largely out of doors, making use of natural populations of insects; Baldwin worked with his daughter in the living room. The first psychologist to take intelligent animal behavior into the laboratory, to provide a clear quantitative account of the course of instrumental learning, and thereby to establish the study of animal learning as a laboratory science was Edward Lee Thorndike (1874-1949).
After graduating from Wesleyan in 1895, Thorndike went to Harvard to study under William James. There, in the Spring of 1896, he heard the British comparative psychologist C. Lloyd Morgan (1852-1936) deliver his influential American lectures on habit and instinct. Within weeks Thorndike was experimenting with chicks, and when he moved to Columbia in 1897 at the completion of his M.A., he took along his two best educated animals. At Columbia he expanded his sample, and in 1898 when he published his doctoral dissertation, Animal Intelligence: An Experimental Study of the Associative Processes in Animals,  he reported data on chickens, cats, and dogs.
Given the direction that American psychology eventually took, Animal Intelligence can probably be considered one of the most influential publications of the first half century of psychological science. Besides offering a theory of instrumental learning later termed the "Law of Effect" and a conception of animal intelligence couched solely in terms of the organism's ability to form new connections, Thorndike developed ingenious apparatus for the observation of animal learning and employed it in systematic laboratory research. In a valuable discussion of Thorndike's early work, M.E. Bitterman has nicely captured the appeal that Thorndike's general experimental technique had for generations of researchers:
"It was objective: it minimized the influence of the observer, who remained quietly in the background. It was quantitative: the course of learning could be measured accurately in terms of the time taken for the appearance of the correct response on each trial. It was reproducible: the work of one investigator could be repeated and verified by others. It was flexible: the responses required could be varied in kind and complexity. It was natural: although the problems presented could not previously have been experienced, they were not too remote from the animal's ordinary course of life, and the actions elicited were enough like the actions described in the anecdotal literature to make possible a direct comparison of experimental and anecdotal data. It was convenient: a large enough sample of animals could be studied to provide a representative picture of each of a variety of species."
While Thorndike was engaged in research with his animals at Columbia, two young men, Linus Ward Kline (b. 1866) and Willard Stanton Small (1870-1943)  were themselves at work in the Psychology Laboratory at Clark University. At that time, the Clark laboratory was under the direction of Edmund Clark Sanford (1859-1924), one of the great pioneers in the development of experimental laboratory technique. 
Like Thorndike, Kline and Small had been inspired by Morgan's Habit and Instinct,  and when Thorndike's dissertation work appeared in 1898, they decided to address the question of animal behavior method themselves. Under the guidance of Sanford, Kline constructed several pieces of laboratory apparatus for the study of the behavior of vorticella, wasps, chicks, and white rats. Indeed, one of these pieces, designed with the assistance of Small, approximated a simple Y-maze.
In the article that we have chosen to reprint here, "Methods in Animal Psychology," Kline criticized Thorndike's over reliance on a purely experimental method, argued for a combination of the naturalistic and experimental approaches, and described the results of his own laboratory research, concluding that "the methods presented here enable us in a comparatively short time to point out more distinctly...the dividing lines between instinct, intelligence, and habit." 
While Kline involved himself in comparative studies, Small focused exclusively on the rat. Published in two parts in 1900/1901, "An Experimental Study of the Mental Processes of the Rat" was Small's most influential paper. In it he described research using an apparatus for the study of intelligence and learning in wild gray and domesticated albino rats that he had modeled after the  Hampton Court Maze. While the specific design was taken from a diagram provided in the Encyclopedia Britannica, the suggestion for use of the Hampton Court maze was that of Edmund Sanford. In studying the behavior of rats in a maze, Small unwittingly introduced a technique into psychology that became so widespread during the heyday of behaviorism that it came for many to symbolize the science itself.
However, early experimental methods for the study of animal behavior were not restricted to the relatively simple way-finding and escape tasks employed by Lubbock, Thorndike, and Small. In England, Leonard Trelawney Hobhouse (1864-1929), most famous for his work in sociology and social philosophy, devised an ingenious series of problem tasks to measure the extent to which animals learn from the perception of results.
Hobhouse was educated at Oxford, where he remained until 1897 first as assistant-tutor and then as a fellow of Corpus Christi College. From 1897 to 1902 he worked on the staff of the Manchester Guardian, writing lead articles at night and studying animal mind in the daytime. In 1902 he moved to London to continue his work in journalism, and five years later he accepted appointment as the University of London's first Professor of Sociology, a position he retained until his death.
It was during the period of his employment with the Guardian that Hobhouse published his great psychological work, Mind in Evolution. Despite an anthropomorphism of description that once made the young Robert M. Yerkes cringe,  Mind in Evolution is a remarkable compendium of methods for the objective study of animal behavior. In Chapter 8, which we have reprinted, Hobhouse provided detailed descriptions of over a dozen different problems that he had presented to dogs, cats, and an elephant. All of the problems involved the manipulation of some sort of a simple mechanism (pulling a string, pushing a door, pushing a lever, sliding a lid, lifting a catch, etc.) to obtain food. In these and in even more complicated problems requiring box stacking and rake use that Hobhouse gave to monkeys, he found evidence of sudden improvement in the learning curve. In Hobhouse's view, these discontinuities reflected the animal's ability to employ perceptual relations in problem solution that he termed "practical judgment" and that later students of animal behavior have termed "insight." 
During the first decade of the 20th century, authors like Hobhouse could be faulted for anthropomorphism of interpretation and still appreciated for objectivism of method. Yet this somewhat schizophrenic state of affairs was rapidly beginning to change. When Herbert Spencer Jennings (1868-1947) published Behavior of the Lower Organisms  in 1906, it was as objective in interpretation as it was in method.
Jennings was born in a small town in Northern Illinois and accepted his first academic position as an assistant professor at Texas A & M in 1889 without having ever been to college. Forced by political infighting to resign along with many others at the end of his first year, Jennings entered Michigan in the Fall of 1990 and moved to Harvard for graduate work in 1894. Completing his Ph.D. after two years, he traveled to Germany for a year of postdoctoral study at Jena with Max Verworn. Verworn had recently published a seminal work on the reactions of protozoa to stimulation,  and he succeeded in interesting Jennings in studying the behavior of unicellular organisms.
After Jennings' return from Germany, he took up successive academic positions at Montana State College, Dartmouth, Michigan, the University of Pennsylvania, and in 1906 John Hopkins, where he remained until his retirement in 1938. In the year in which Jennings moved to Hopkins, his long-awaited Behavior of the Lower Organisms appeared. The first twelve chapters were devoted to detailed descriptions of the behavior of unicellular animals, plants, and coelenterates; the remainder of the book was theoretical. Throughout, as biologist Raymond Pearl (1879-1940) put it, "the objective point of view is very carefully and consistently maintained." Nowhere was this more apparent than in Chapters 16 and 17, which we have reprinted here.
In the analysis presented in these chapters, Jennings made a clear case for the determination of behavior by the physiological state of the organism and for dependence of physiological state on a combination of objective factors such as present and former stimulation, former reactions of the organism, and autonomous internal changes. This is a purely objective analysis, and it was so recognized by the "behavior men" of the day. As Robert Yerkes put it, Behavior of the Lower Organisms "stands alone, the first representative of a class of books in which animal behavior is to receive thoroughly scientific treatment." 
Yerkes' opinion could not be taken lightly. After Watson, Robert Mearns Yerkes (1876-1956) was probably the most influential proponent of an objective approach to the study of animal behavior. All three of the final selections in this collection were authored or co-authored by Yerkes and the terms of behaviorism itself were worked out by Watson at least in part through his correspondence with Yerkes.
Robert Yerkes was born, grew up, and was educated in rural Pennsylvania not far from Philadelphia. After graduating from Ursinus College, he set off for graduate work at Harvard. There he studied heliotropism in Daphnia on the advice of biologist Charles B. Davenport (1866-1944) and completed a Ph.D. dissertation in 1902 on the sensory reaction and nervous physiology of the jellyfish under Hugo Mnsterberg (1863-1916). For the next 15 years he remained at Harvard first as instructor and then as an assistant professor of comparative psychology. When America entered World War I, Yerkes was put in charge of organizing the development of the Army Alpha intelligence test. In 1924 he moved to Yale, from which he retired twenty years later.
As Watson was flamboyant, Yerkes was moderate; where Watson was an iconoclast, Yerkes served merely as a critic. When Watson was impolitic, Yerkes was judicious. While Yerkes never quite became a behaviorist in the Watsonian mold , in the long run his thoroughgoing mainstream objectivism probably exerted as much or even more influence on his science than did Watson's more extreme views.
The most important work of Yerkes' early period is unquestionably The Dancing Mouse, published in 1907. In a review in the Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods, Watson called Yerkes' book, "the nearest approach yet made by any student of behavior to giving a complete and systematic account of the varieties and complexities of the actions of a mammalian race,"  and Margaret Floy Washburn (1871-1939), whose sympathies were anything but behaviorist, called it "the most valuable contribution that has yet been made to the study of animal behavior." 
In the Dancing Mouse, Yerkes made a number of important methodological advances. These innovations are especially evident in Chapters 12-14, reprinted here, in which Yerkes discussed the methods and results of his studies of habit formation. In these studies, he substituted a punctate, easily controlled stimulus event (slight electric shock) for the more variable hunger satisfaction traditionally used to reinforce the animal's response. He reported training results not in the usual terms of the time required to perform the action, which is also highly variable, but in terms either of the number of errors made or the number of trials required to reach criterion. Both of these measures became favored indices of learning in later behavioral research. Finally, Yerkes provided much explicit discussion of issues of method, offering his fellow researchers a helpful analysis of the relative value of the problem, maze, and discrimination methods for assessing animal learning and intelligence.
In 1909, with Sergius Morgulis (b. 1885), then a Harvard graduate student in biochemistry, Yerkes published a short article that ranks as one of the most significant in the development of behaviorism. In this article,  "The Method of Pawlow in Animal Psychology," Yerkes and Morgulis provided English speaking students of animal behavior with their first introduction to the techniques of Pavlovian salivary reflex conditioning. Six years later, Watson would devote his American Psychological Association Presidential address to "The Place of the Conditioned Reflex in Psychology,"  arguing that the method offered an objective approach to the study of sensory phenomena previously thought accessible only to introspection. 
Finally, in 1911, Yerkes collaborated with Watson on a monograph, Methods of Studying Vision in Animals, that is widely considered to be the most important contribution to objective method during the rise of behaviorism. Two years earlier while on leave from Harvard, Yerkes had gone to Johns Hopkins as a visiting scientist, where he and Watson made good use of the visit to develop a new apparatus and method for the study of visual discrimination in animals. The opening section of Methods of Studying Vision, reprinted here, contained the first detailed description of this new technique.
The Yerkes-Watson discrimination method was designed to provide a source of stimuli for the study of animal vision that was natural, controllable, constant, and measurable. The animal's response was carefully constrained and easily quantified. Here, at long last, psychology had a purely objective stimulus-response technique for assessment and cross-species comparisons in animal vision. Not surprisingly, the Yerkes-Watson method came to serve for many years as the standard behavioral technique in American laboratories of comparative psychology.
More importantly, however, the Yerkes-Watson method was an exemplar of the relative perfection to which objective methodology could be taken. In 1911, objective methods had been in use for almost forty years. As is obvious from the material in this reprint collection, neither Yerkes nor Watson was by any means the first to emphasize behavior or the importance of objective method. The methods of Spalding, however, were not those of Yerkes and Watson. The road from Spalding's first experiments with homemade hoods on newborn chicks to the lamp carriage construction drawings provided by Yerkes and Watson had been long. Numerous issues -- behavior records, experimental control, quantification, measurement, and research design -- had been met along the way.
Methodologically, the tools for "the scientific determination of modes of behavior and the modus operandi of behavior...(for) an objective standard of interpretation...without mentioning consciousness or deviating from a (wide) biological point of view" were in place. The field of psychology, if not quite ready to embrace behaviorism,  was at least ready to let Watson speak. In 1913, at Columbia University, Watson did just that; the movement known as "behaviorism" was launched.
1. Watson, J.B. (1913). Psychology as the behaviorist views it. Psychological Review, 20, 158-177. This lecture was given at Columbia University on February 24, 1913. [Back to top]
2. See, for example: Woodworth, R.S. (1938). Experimental psychology. NY: Henry Holt. [Back to top]
3. Watson (1913), p. 158. [Back to top]
4. See, for example: Tolman, E.C. (1952). Edward Chace Tolman. In Boring, E.G.; Langfeld, H.S.; Werner, H., & Yerkes, R.M. (Eds). A history of psychology in autobiography. Worcester, MA: Clark University Press, p. 329; and Hull, C.L. (1952). Clark L. Hull. In Boring, E.G.; Langfeld, H.S.; Werner, H., & Yerkes, R.M. (Eds). A history of psychology in autobiography. Worcester, MA: Clark University Press, pp. 153-154. [Back to top]
5. See: Logue, A.W. (1985). The origins of behaviorism: Antecedents and proclamation. In C.E. Buxton (Ed). Points of view in the modern history of psychology. Orlando, FL: Academic Press. pp. 141-167. [Back to top]
6. See the Watson/Yerkes correspondance, quoted in Buckley, K.W. (1989). Mechanical man. John Broadus Watson and the beginnings of behaviorism. NY: Guilford Press, especially pp. 71-72. [Back to top]
7. See: Gray, P.H. (1962). Douglas Alexander Spalding: The first experimental behaviorist. Journal of General Psychology, 67, 299-307. [Back to top]
8. Throughout this period, one disaster had followed upon another in the Amberley household. In 1874, first Lady Amberley then her daughter died of diptheria. Lord Amberley died in January 1876. [Back to top]
9. Gray (1962); Gray, P.H. (1967). Spalding and his influence on research in developmental behavior. Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences, 3, 168-179; and Gray, P.H. (1968). Prerequisite to an analysis of behaviorism: The conscious automaton theory from Spalding to William James. Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences, 4, 365-376. [Back to top]
10. Gray (1962), pp. 302-303. [Back to top]
11. Spalding, D.A. (1873). Instinct. With original observations on young animals. Macmillan's Magazine, 27, 282-293. [Back to top]
12. Spalding, D.A. (1872). On instinct. Nature, 6, 485-486. [Back to top]
13. Darwin, C. (1859). On the origin of the species by means of natural selection, or, The preservation of favoured races in the struggle for life. London: John Murray. [Back to top]
14. Darwin, C. (1871). The descent of man, and selection in relation to sex. London: John Murray. [Back to top]
15. Darwin (1877). A biographical sketch of an infant. Mind, 2, 285-294. [Back to top]
16. Ibid., p. 286. [Back to top]
17. Another exceptionally important individual in this regard was Francis Galton (1822-1911), Darwin's half cousin. See especially: Galton, F. (1883) Inquiries into human faculty and its development. London: Macmillan. [Back to top]
18. Biographical material has been taken from: Davis, H.W.C. & Weaver, J.R.H. (1927). Dictionary of National Biography. London: Oxford University Press. [Back to top]
19. Lubbock, J. (1882). Ants, bees, and wasps. A record of observations on the habits of the social hymenoptera. London: Kegan Paul, Trench & Co. [Back to top]
20. See, for example: Lubbock (1882), pp. 240-241. [Back to top]
21. Ibid., pp. 242-243. [Back to top]
22. It will come as no surprise to anyone familiar with the work of Francis Galton that some of Lubbock's apparatus development took place in collaboration with Galton. See, for example: Lubbock (1882), p. 263. [Back to top]
23. Baldwin, J.M. (1894). The origin of right-handedness. Popular Science Monthly, 44, 606-615. [Back to top]
24. See, for example: Wozniak, R.H. (1982). Metaphysics and science, reason and reality: The intellectual origins of genetic epistemology. In J. Broughton & D.J. Freeman-Moir (Eds). The cognitive-developmental psychology of James Mark Baldwin. NJ: Ablex. [Back to top]
25. Although his Ph.D was awarded by Princeton for study under James McCosh (1811-1894), Baldwin spent a semester at Leipzig with Wilhelm Wundt (1832-1920) and a semester in Berlin studying Spinoza with Friedrich Paulsen (1846-1908). [Back to top]
26. Wozniak (1982); and Richards, R.J. (1987). Darwin and the emergence of evolutionary theories of mind and behavior. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. [Back to top]
27. Baldwin (1894), p. 606. [Back to top]
28. Ibid. [Back to top]
29. Ibid., pp. 606-607. [Back to top]
30. Biographical material has been taken from: Gates, A.I. (1949). Edward L. Thorndike, 1874-1949. Psychological Review, 56, 241-243; Goodenough, F.L. (1950). American Journal of Psychology, 63, 291-301; and Bitterman, M.E. (1969).Thorndike and the problem of animal intelligence. American Psychologist, 24, 444-453[Back to top]
31. Morgan, C.L. (1896). Habit and instinct. London: Edward Arnold. [Back to top]
32. Thorndike, E.L. (1898). Animal intelligence. An experimental study of the associative process in animals. Psychological Review, Monograph Supplements, 2(4). 109p. [Back to top]
33. Bitterman (1969), p. 446. [Back to top]
34. Very little is known about the lives of either of these men. A few biographical facts can be gleaned from: Dewsbury, D.A. (1984). Comparative psychology in the twentieth century. Stroudsburg, PA: Hutchinson Ross. pp. 305-306, 321-322. [Back to top]
35. Sanford, E.C. (1894/1898). A course in experimental psychology. Boston: D.C. Heath & Co. [Back to top]
36. Morgan (1896). [Back to top]
37. Kline, L.W. (1899). Methods in animal psychology. American Journal of Psychology, 10, 256-279. [Back to top]
38. Ibid., p. 279. [Back to top]
39. Small, W.S. (1900-1901). Experimental study of the mental processes of the rat. American Journal of Psychology,11, 133-165; 12, 206-239. [Back to top]
40. Ibid., p. 207. [Back to top]
41. Ibid., p. 239. [Back to top]
42. Biographical material has been taken from: Weaver, J.R.H. (1937). Dictionary of National Biography. London: Oxford University Press.
[Back to top] 43. Hobhouse, L.T. (1901). Mind in evolution. London: Macmillan. [Back to top]
44. Cited in: Dewsbury, D.A. (1984). Comparative psychology in the twentieth century. Stroudsburg, PA: Hutchinson Ross Publishing Company. p. 303. [Back to top]
45. See, for example: Khler, W. (1925). The mentality of apes. NY: Harcourt, Brace & Co. Indeed, Hobhouse's problems became the basis for many of the tasks that Khler used in his later studies of insight in monkeys and apes. [Back to top]
46. The details of this rather remarkable fact of Jennings' life are provided in: Sonneborn, T.M. (1975). Herbert Spencer Jennings, April 8, 1868 -- April 14, 1947. Biographical Memoirs of the National Academy of Sciences, 47, 143-205 along with much of the other material on which this brief biographical sketch is based. [Back to top]
47. Jennings, H.S. (1906). Behavior of the lower organisms. NY: Columbia University Press. [Back to top]
48. Verworn, M. (1889). Psychophysiologische Protisten-Studien. Experimentelle Untersuchungen. Jena: G. Fischer. [Back to top]
49. Pearl, R. (1907). [Review of] Jennings, H.S. Behavior of the Lower Organisms...The Journal of Comparative Neurology and Psychology, 17, 93-97. [Back to top]
50. Yerkes, R.M. (1906). [Review of] Behavior of the Lower Organisms...Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods, 3, 658-666. [Back to top]
51. See: Buckley (1989), especially Chapter 4. [Back to top]
52. Biographical material has been taken from: Carmichael, L. (1957). Robert Mearns Yerkes, 1876-1956. Psychological Review, 64, 1-7; and Hilgard, E.R. (1965). Robert Mearns Yerkes, May 26, 1876 -- February 3, 1956. Biographical Memoirs of the National Academy of Sciences, 38, 385-409[Back to top]
53. See: Buckley (1989), especially pp. 86-87. [Back to top]
54. Yerkes, R.M. (1907). The dancing mouse. NY: Macmillan. [Back to top]
55. Watson, J.B. (1908). [Review of] The Dancing Mouse... Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods, 5, 184-189. [Back to top]
56. Washburn, M.F. (1908). [Review of] Yerkes, Robert M. The Dancing Mouse... Journal of Comparative Neurology and Psychology, 18, 336-339. [Back to top]
57. Yerkes, R.M. & Morgulis, S. (1909). The method of Pawlow in animal psychology. Psychological Bulletin, 6, 257-273. [Back to top]
58. Watson, J.B. (1916). The place of the conditioned-reflex in psychology. Psychological Review, 23, 89-116. [Back to top]
59. See: Buckley (1989), pp. 87-88, for a nice discussion of the importance of conditioning methods in Watson's overall scheme. [Back to top]
60. Yerkes, R.M. & Watson, J.B. (1911). Methods of studying vision in animals. Boston: Holt. [Behavior Monographs, Number 2]. [Back to top]
61. Letter from Watson to Yerkes, October 29, 1909, quoted in Buckley (1989), p. 71. [Back to top]
62. Samelson, F. (1981). Struggle for scientific authority: The reception of Watson's behaviorism, 1913-1920. Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences, 17, 399-425. [Back to top]