The following text is © 1997 Robert Wozniak. All hyperlinked text links to footnotes located at the bottom of the document.
Robert H. Wozniak
Bryn Mawr College
On the 24th of February, 1913, at a meeting of the New York Branch of the American Psychological Association held at Columbia University, John Broadus Watson (1878-1958), a 35-year-old "animal behavior man" from Johns Hopkins University, stepped to the podium to begin the first of a series of lectures that he was to deliver at Columbia that spring. Watson had entitled his first lecture "Psychology as the Behaviorist Views It," and his opening statement is probably the most widely quoted passage in the history of modern psychology:
"Psychology as the behaviorist views it is a purely objective experimental branch of natural science. Its theoretical goal is the prediction and control of behavior. Introspection forms no essential part of its methods, nor is the scientific value of its data dependent upon the readiness with which they lend themselves to interpretation in terms of consciousness. The behaviorist, in his efforts to get a unitary scheme of animal response, recognizes no dividing line between man and brute. The behavior of man, with all of its refinement and complexity, forms only a part of the behaviorist's total scheme of investigation."
In this passage and throughout the remainder of this lecture, Watson called for a radical revisioning of the scope and method of psychological research. Introspection was to be abandoned in favor of the study of behavior. Behavior was to be evaluated in its own right, independent of its relationship to any consciousness that might exist. The concept of "consciousness" was to be rejected as an interpretive standard and eschewed as an explanatory device. As an objective, natural science, psychology was to make no sharp distinction between human and animal behavior; and its goal was to develop principles by which behavior could be predicted and controlled.
Published in the Psychological Review shortly after its delivery and incorporated within the first chapter of Watson's 1914 Behavior: A Textbook of Comparative Psychology,  this lecture would eventually come to be known as the 'Behaviorist Manifesto." Generations of psychologists, reared in a post-Watsonian discipline that defined itself as the "science of behavior," would be taught that Watson was the father of behaviorism and that February 24, 1913 was the day on which modern behaviorism had been born.
There is, of course, some truth to this. On that fateful day in 1913, Watson did reject the mainstream view, and he did do so in uncompromising terms:
"Psychology...has failed signally, I believe, during the fifty-odd years of its existence as an experimental discipline to make its place in the world as an undisputed natural science. Psychology, as it is generally thought of, has something esoteric in its methods. If you fail to reproduce my findings, it is not due to some fault in your apparatus or in the control of your stimulus, but it is due to the fact that your introspection is untrained...I firmly believe that two hundred years from now, unless the introspective method is discarded, psychology will still be divided on the question of whether auditory sensations have the quality of 'extension,'...whether there is a difference in 'texture' between image and sensation and upon many hundreds of others of like character." 
Five weeks later, in the second of his Columbia lectures, Watson escalated his rejection of the mainstream view into outright war. Employing metaphors of the battlefield, he flatly denied the existence of centrally aroused mental images, argued that implicit verbal behavior -- not the image -- intervenes between stimulus and response, and reasserted his claim that the objective methods of the behaviorist know no dividing line between animal and human behavior:
"Imagery from Galton on has been the inner stronghold of a psychology based on introspection. All of the outer defenses might be given over to the enemy, but the cause could never be wholly lost as long as the pass (introspection) to this stronghold (image) could be maintained. So well guarded is the image that it would seem almost foolhardy for us to make an attack on it. If I did not perceive certain signs of weakening on the part of the garrison...I should better admit the claims of imagery...(but) I prefer to attack rather to remain upon the defensive.
"There are no centrally initiated processes...Where explicit behavior is delayed (i.e., where deliberation ensues), the intervening time between stimulus and response is given over to implicit behavior (to "thought processes")...If implicit behavior can be shown to consist of nothing but words movements...the behavior of the human being as a whole is as open to objective observation and control as is the behavior of the lowest organism."
Frustrated with what he perceived to be psychologists' failure to appreciate the value of behavior in its own right, Watson then embarked on a personal campaign to change the face of psychological science. An indefatigable and effective self-publicist fond of referring to himself in the third person as "the behaviorist," he used his public position as professor of psychology at Hopkins, editor of several of the field's most influential journals, and contributor to the popular press to proselytize for behaviorism. Even when his career as an academic psychologist was abruptly and involuntarily cut short in 1920, Watson continued to press his case. By the time he left the field for good in the early 1930s, behaviorism had succeeded in taking center stage within American psychology.
Like many origin myths, however, the story of Watson's founding of behaviorism is oversimplified and misleading. Watson was by no means the first to criticize psychology's use of the concept of "consciousness" or the method of introspection; his was not even the first attempt to rid psychology of "consciousness" altogether or to argue the case against all use of introspection. Watson was not the first to use objective, experimental methods in the study of behavior, or to propose a unitary scheme for the investigation of animal and human response. Indeed, even prediction and control of behavior had been articulated as worthy goals of psychological science prior to Watson's manifesto of 1913.
When Watson ascended the speaker's platform at Columbia, psychology was a discipline in serious disarray. The root source of the problem was an almost total lack of agreement among psychologists as to the nature of consciousness. William James (1842-1910) had triggered the debate with his famous 1904 attack on the concept of consciousness, "Does Consciousness Exist?" Was consciousness a metaphysical entity or simply a particular sort of relationship toward objects into which portions of pure experience enter? Was consciousness a stream of experience, a kind of awareness, or thought? Was it an adaptive function or a composite of states; an energetic by-product of neurophysiological process, another name for associative learning, a form of arrested movement, a regulator of future adaptation, or simply another way of describing "self"? Truly, as Ralph Barton Perry (1876-1957) put it, there was "no philosophical term at once so popular and so devoid of standard meaning."
In this state of affairs psychologists found themselves faced with a very significant dilemma. On the one hand, even in the midst of conceptual chaos with respect to "consciousness," there was something on which almost all psychologists could agree: the right of psychology to exist as a science independent of biology and physiology was grounded in psychology's claim to being the science of consciousness. No matter how closely related psychology might become to its sister sciences, psychologists could always carve out their own academic and intellectual niche by emphasizing that the study of consciousness was theirs and theirs alone.
On the other hand, psychologists realized that their claim to autonomy as a science was founded on quicksand. How could a science of consciousness function as an independent science in the face of almost total disagreement over the nature of its most basic subject matter? Psychology found itself in the unenviable position of being the science of "who knew what." The contradiction inherent in this state of affairs was all too painfully and embarrassingly evident. By itself this would have been bad enough, but matters were actually much worse.
In principle at least, psychologists might have been able to extract themselves from the horns of their dilemma by acting as scientists are supposed to act in the face of divergent opinion; they might have let the data decide. Unfortunately, however, disagreement over the nature of "consciousness," was not only disagreement over content, it was also conflict over method. To many it seemed that the only adequate method for the study of consciousness, whatever consciousness might be, was introspection. Yet introspection was the use of consciousness to study consciousness; problems of interpretation were multiplied geometrically. One could hardly expect reliability from a method erected on a foundation that shifted from experimenter to experimenter and theorist to theorist.
During the first decade of the new century, it would have been difficult to pick up a theoretical journal in psychology without being confronted with this controversy. In article after article, psychologists and philosophers of all persuasions attempted to address a series of critical questions: What is the nature of psychology as a science and how is it related to biology and physiology? What is consciousness, and how should the term "consciousness" be employed? By what criteria can consciousness be attributed to animals, and how is consciousness related to behavior on the one hand and nervous activity on the other? What is the nature of introspection, what are its limits, and how are the data of introspection related to those provided by the observation of behavior?
This was the context for Watson's manifesto. Psychology was badly in need of someone who could cut a simple path through the chaotic web of controversy in which it found itself enmeshed. Watson did just that. None of his ideas were new. None of his ideas were complex. He simply pulled the strands of controversy together and severed them with a single, radical stroke. Watson threw out consciousness. By throwing out consciousness, he rid psychology of introspection. What remained -- an objective psychology of behavior -- he termed "behaviorism," described as a revolution, and claimed for his own, referring to himself as "the behaviorist. "
What happened in 1913 was not novel; it was not a significant break with the immediate past; and if it did eventually become a revolution, it was very slow to develop. Immediately after its publication, Watson's "manifesto" evoked no more vigorous response from other psychologists, pro or con, than did any number of other contributions to the controversy published during the same period. Psychologists did not suddenly flock to Watson's point of view. Indeed, what reaction there was was generally unenthusiastic. As Samelson has described it:
"Supported by the Zeitgeist, Behaviorism supposedly spread quickly through psychology after the publication of Watson's manifesto in 1913. But an extensive search of published and unpublished source material from 1913 to 1920 shows only limited support and a good deal of resistance; documentary evidence for the conversion of psychologists to radical behaviorism during these years is hard to find. Though faced with some troubling problems, the discipline was not eager to renounce its established scientific authority and expertise on the mind." 
When behaviorism did eventually begin to spread throughout psychology, during the late 1920s and 1930s, it did so not by converting the old guard but by capturing the enthusiasm of young minds in succeeding generations. By the mid-1930s, psychology has become the science of behavior, and behaviorism, methodological and/or theoretical, had become its dominant orientation.
In this volume we have brought together a representative sample of the more important contributions to the context of intellectual controversy from within which behaviorism arose. In order to provide a sense of the historical development of the relevant ideas, the articles in this volume are presented chronologically and they can be read with profit in that order. Conceptually, however, these articles fall into three broad if inextricably interlinked categories: a) functionalism and the nature of psychology; b) the nature and evolution of "consciousness"; and c) the critique of introspection. Discussion here will focus on each of these categories in turn. We will then conclude with a very brief analysis of the first published reactions to Watson's call to arms.
Functionalism and the Nature of Psychology
Between 1904 and 1913, the question of the nature of psychology as science was constantly in the air. A surprisingly large number of publications during this period addressed just this question. From among these we have chosen to reprint seven articles that exemplify trends critical for the emergence of behaviorism. The first such article, "The Conceptions and Methods of Psychology," consisted of material that was presented in 1904 by James McKeen Cattell (1860-1944) in a lecture to the St. Louis Congress of Arts and Science.
Trained at Leipzig with Wilhelm Wundt (1832-1920) and in London with Francis Galton (1822-1911), Cattell was a leader among the experimentalists of his generation. He had introduced experimental psychology to Bryn Mawr College, the University of Pennsylvania, and Columbia University and co-founded the influential Psychological Review. At the time of his presentation in St. Louis, Cattell was Professor of Psychology at Columbia, editor of Science, the Popular Science Monthly, and the Archives of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods. He was, in other words, in a particularly favorable position to assess the state of the art in psychology, and he did so in no uncertain terms:
"Psychology has never had a well-defined territory. As states of consciousness appear to be less stable and definite than the objects of the material world, so the science of psychology is more shifting in its contents and more uncertain in its methods than any physical science. We are told, indeed, in our introductory textbooks that psychology is the science of mind, and that mind and matter are the most diverse things in the world...that psychology is a positive science...set...off from sociology, history, philology, and the rest. But while these verbal definitions may satisfy the college sophomore, they must be perplexing to the candidate for the doctor's degree."
After reviewing relevant theories of the relation of mind and body and discussing available conceptions of the nature of consciousness, Cattell acknowledged his inability to define the field of psychology and issued one of the earliest direct challenges to both the conception of psychology as the science of consciousness and the use of introspective method:
"I am not convinced that psychology should be limited to the study of consciousness as such...(T)he ever-increasing acuteness of introspective analysis...forms an important chapter in modern psychology; but the positive scientific results are small in quantity when compared with the objective experimental work accomplished in the past fifty years...(T)he rather widespread notion that there is no psychology apart from introspection is refuted by the brute argument of accomplished fact.
"It seems to me that most of the research work that has been done by me or in my laboratory is nearly as independent of introspection as work in physics or in zošlogy. The time of mental processes, the accuracy of perception and movement, the range of consciousness, fatigue, and practice, the motor accompaniments of thought, memory, the association of ideas, the perception of space, color-vision, preferences, judgments, individual differences, the behavior of animals and of children, these and other topics I have investigated, without requiring the slightest introspection on the part of the subject or undertaking such on my own part during the course of the experiments. It is usually no more necessary for the subject to be a psychologist than for the vivisected frog to be a physiologist."
Although Cattell did not, in 1904, refer to himself explicitly as a "functionalist," the point of view that he articulated was quite close to that of functionalism. Functionalism was an approach to consciousness and to the definition of psychology as science then being worked out by psychologists and philosophers at the University of Chicago. In 1907, in his Presidential Address to the American Psychological Association, James Rowland Angell (1869-1949) staked out "The Province of Functional Psychology."
Educated under John Dewey (1859-1952) at Michigan, William James at Harvard, and Hermann Ebbinghaus (1850-1909) in Berlin, Angell spent a year as an instructor in psychology at the University of Minnesota and twenty-five years in psychology and administration at the University of Chicago before accepting an offer in 1920 to become President of the Carnegie Corporation and eventually President of Yale. At Chicago, one of Angell's most promising students was John B. Watson, and there is little question of the influence that the functionalist perspective exerted on the development of Watson's approach to behavior.
Functionalism in the Chicago style involved three related questions: How does X function? What is the function of X? And of what is X a function? The focus, in other words, was on process, on use value, and on dependent relations to antecedent conditions. On the positive side the Chicago functionalists were influenced by the process approach to consciousness of William James and the evolutionary emphasis of Charles Darwin (1809-1882) on the survival value of biological structures and processes and on thedependent relationship between the organism and its environment.  On the negative side, their thought took form as a reaction against the excessively analytic, content-oriented structuralism of Edward Bradford Titchener (1867-1927). As Angell described the movement:
"Functional psychology...involves the...effort to discern and portray the typical operations of consciousness under actual life conditions, as over against the attempt to analyze and describe its elementary and complex contents...It is...synonymous with descriptions and theories of mental action as distinct from the material of mental constitution... The most essential quarrel which the functionalist has with structuralism in its thoroughgoing and consistent form...touches the feasibility and worth of the effort to get at mental process as it is under the conditions of actual experience rather than as it appears to a merely post mortem analysis...The functional psychologist...is wont to take his cue from the basal conception of the evolutionary movement, i.e., that for the most part organic structures and functions possess their present characteristics by virtue of the efficiency with which they fit into the extant conditions of life broadly designated the environment."
In this same year in a short paper entitled "A Broader Basis for Psychology Necessary," a variant of the functionalist approach was also articulated by Edwin A Kirkpatrick (1862-1937). Among the first students to earn the Ph.D. from Clark University, Kirkpatrick spent his entire academic career at the State Teachers College at Fitchburg, Massachusetts. Imbued with the evolutionary geneticism imparted to many of Clark's early students by its founding President, G. Stanley Hall (1844-1924), Kirkpatrick reacted sharply against the notion that psychology was the science that "seeks to classify and explain conscious phenomena only." Pointing to the fact that "a few terms...such as behavior, function , etc. that do not imply either presence or absence of consciousness, have come into use...", Kirkpatrick argued that more were needed -- especially in the genetic field where "the terms and definitions based on the introspections of highly developed states of consciousness are totally unsuited to describe the mental states of animals, children, and the lower races."
To meet this need, Kirkpatrick proceeded to coin the term "organosis" to signify adaptive functioning at any and all levels. Identifying several such levels (vegetative organosis, sensorimotor organosis, representative organosis, and abstract or thinking organosis), he then suggested that studying "functioning, organosis or intelligence from the conscious side only is much like trying to understand the movements of an engine...by watching the operator." Consciousness may influence behavior but there was much more to functioning than consciousness. What was needed, in Kirkpatrick's view, was a functional, genetic approach. Only when such an approach was more fully worked out would psychology be "transformed...its accepted facts...illuminated, explained, and placed in their proper perspective in relation to other sciences and to the theory of evolution..." 
Functionalism was one approach to the nature of consciousness and of psychology as science; structuralism was another. Still a third was the self psychology of Mary Whiton Calkins (1863-1930). Although as a woman she was barred from receiving the degree, Calkins completed all the requirements for the Ph.D. under William James, Josiah Royce (1855-1916) and Hugo Mźnsterberg (1863-1916) at Harvard. She invented the widely used paired-associative technique for the study of memory and served on the faculty of Wellesley College, where she had established a psychological laboratory, from 1891 until her retirement in 1929.
In 1907, shortly after the appearance of Angell's programmatic outline of functionalism, Calkins published what was in part a reply to Angell. In "Psychology: What is It About?" she gave voice to the definitional problem then confronting all psychologists, and she did so in a way that makes it quite clear that Watson's was by no means the first attempt to rid psychology of consciousness:
"Psychology has been variously defined as the science of 'consciousness' or of 'the mental life' or of 'experience.' Of late years vigorous attempts have been made, from the most various motives, to eject the term consciousness from our vocabulary... (and) "even among psychologists who agree to define psychology, in a preliminary way, as 'science of consciousness' or 'science of the mental life' or 'science of psychical phenomena,' there is disagreement in regard to the further limitation of the conception." 
Lest the reader fail to appreciate the extent of such disagreement, Calkins then offered a detailed criticism of both the structuralist approach to psychology as science of the mental state and the functionalist's science of mental function. Although she left detailed discussion of her own perspective for future papers, Calkins made it eminently clear that for her it was possible to define psychology still another way -- as the science of a conscious self.
During this period, psychologists were not the only ones incapable of developing a unified conception of consciousness and of psychology as a science. In 1910, Robert Mearns Yerkes (1876-1956), then on the faculty at Harvard, asked a sample of leading biologists and physiologists whether they considered psychology to be a part of physiology and, if so, how they would define psychology.
After completing a Ph.D. dissertation in 1902 on the sensory reaction and nervous physiology of the jellyfish under Mźnsterberg, Yerkes had remained at Harvard, first as instructor and then as an assistant professor of comparative psychology. When America entered World War I, he entered the military and was put in charge of organizing the development of the Army Alpha intelligence test. After the war, Yerkes moved to Yale, from which he retired twenty years later. At the time of his retirement he was considered by many to be one of the most influential proponents of an objective approach to the study of animal behavior.
When Yerkes reported the results of his survey in an article, "Psychology in Its Relations to Biology," his analysis did little to clarify the situation. Biologists, he found, were not only just as variable in their views as psychologists, but many held opinions that either threatened the existence of psychology as an independent science or questioned the very possibility that psychology could be scientific. Thus, for example, some of Yerkes' respondents viewed consciousness as a form of energy resulting from brain activity. Believing that consciousness so defined could be studied only as energy, they assumed that when physiology was sufficiently advanced, psychology would disappear. For others, consciousness was so sharply distinguished from physical phenomena that it was assumed that consciousness could not be studied with the techniques of physical science at all. Psychology as the study of consciousness could not therefore be considered a science.
Although by this time it could hardly have done much to bolster psychologists' sagging self-esteem, Yerkes did find some biologists in agreement with the general view that psychologists held of themselves -- that psychology, as "the systematic and persistent attempt to describe and explain the facts of consciousness," was not only a science but an independent science. Defending this view himself, and operating under the obvious influence of William James,  Yerkes suggested that the only difference between psychology and the natural sciences was one of whether the "objects" of science were viewed objectively or subjectively. Physics and psychics examine the same objects from different points of view and with different attitudes toward their materials." All of the general methods of physical science, therefore, are applicable to the study of consciousness; the aims and purposes of psychology are the same as those of natural science. Only with time would it be possible to tell whether the scientific investigation of consciousness would prove to be worthwhile.
As Yerkes was fighting this rear guard action, other trends were beginning to emerge. In 1911 Max Meyer (1873-1967),  an immigrant German psychologist trained by Carl Stumpf (1848-1936) at Berlin and serving as Professor of Psychology at the University of Missouri, published an extraordinary little book, The Fundamental Laws of Human Behavior. The Fundamental Laws has been called the first "completely behavioristic explanation of human action" -- and to some extent it was. Meyer rejected the explanatory use of mental states except as shorthand for the operation of complex nervous processes, emphasized the importance of behavior, and limited the scientific value of introspection solely to "the fact that it aids us in discovering the laws of nervous function."  In 1912, he followed his book with a paper entitled, "The Present Status of the Problem of the Relation between Mind and Body." 
Without denying the reality of consciousness, Meyer attacked the view that a scientific understanding of animal life requires the introduction of consciousness into the chain of causes and effects and argued instead for his own reductive view:
"We must try to establish definite nervous correlates for all the specific mental states and mental functions which are used in and seemingly cannot be spared from our descriptions of human life in the mental and social sciences. I venture to predict that those terms of mental function, for which no nervous correlate can be found, are the very ones which are superfluous, can be spared from our descriptions of mental life in man and animals."
Finally, in 1913, just as Watson was mounting his attack on consciousness and introspection, Maurice Parmelee (1882-1969),  a colleague of Meyer's at the University of Missouri, published the first textbook explicitly calling itself The Science of Human Behavior.  A graduate of Yale and Columbia, Parmelee served on the faculty at the Universities of Kansas, Missouri, Minnesota and the City College of New York. Although he was nominally a sociologist, Parmelee's approach to the behavioral sciences attempted to integrate aspects of biology, psychology, and sociology.
In the first chapter of The Science of Human Behavior, which we have reprinted here, Parmelee defined "behavior" in terms of the "visible movements of the animal organism which constitute the external physiological processes" and argued for the use of this concept in a broad enough fashion to encompass aspects of biology, psychology, and sociology. After discussing the nature of his genetic method, he then provided an overall outline of the volume as whole. As is apparent from the outline, Parmelee devoted much of the remainder of the volume to tracing the continuity of behavior from tropism to reflex to instinct to intelligence in a manner somewhat reminiscent of Jacques Loeb (1859-1924). Although unable to rid his account entirely of "consciousness," a fact which one of his reviewers attributed to "vestigial scruples of intellectual conscience, rather than an immediate sense of... scientific necessity,"  Parmelee nonetheless attempted to retain a consistent focus on behavior, even while extending his analysis to the social activities of animals and human beings.
From the seven articles just described, it is more than apparent that by 1913 psychology was in crisis. The old conception of psychology as the science of consciousness was far from dead, yet definitions of consciousness prevalent among psychologists were almost as numerous as psychologists themselves. Introspection was under attack; attempts were already being made to formulate a science of behavior; and psychologists concerned with the future of their infant science found themselves surrounded on the one side by those who denied the possibility of a scientific psychology and on the other by those who thought that "psychology as science" was merely a subdivision of biology. This was the intellectual context within which John B. Watson strode to the podium in 1913.
The Nature and Evolution of Consciousness
Arguments over the definition of psychology were also conflicts over the nature and evolution of consciousness. Discussions of consciousness, however, could and frequently did take place without explicit reference to psychology. As a result, between 1904 and 1913, analyses of the nature of "consciousness" were even more common than those involving the status of psychology as science. The debate began with the publication in 1904 of a complex and important paper by William James, provocatively entitled "Does 'Consciousness' Exist?" In this paper, James attacked the concept of "consciousness" as a substance and argued for a view of consciousness as knowing function:
"For twenty years past I have mistrusted 'consciousness' as an entity; for seven or eight years past I have suggested its non-existence to my students, and tried to give them its pragmatic equivalent in realities of experience. It seems to me that the hour is ripe for it to be openly and universally discarded...I mean only to deny that the word stands for an entity, but to insist most emphatically that it does stand for a function. There is, I mean, no aboriginal stuff or quality of being, contrasted with that of which material objects are made, out of which our thoughts of them are made; but there is a function in experience which thoughts perform...That function is knowing. '" 
In discussing the nature of consciousness as knowing experience, James proposed an extraordinarily influential view of the nature of the relationship between the mental and the physical. Indeed, so influential was this proposal that echoes of the terms of James's analysis can be heard throughout many of the papers in this collection. For James, mental and physical, subjective and objective, thought and thing were merely internal relationships within experience itself. Taken in the context of one set of associates, a particular experience could be construed as a state of mind, as "consciousness." Taken in a different context, as James put it, "the same undivided bit of experience plays the part of a thing known, of an objective 'content.'"[54 In a single stroke, James obliterated the traditional view of consciousness on which psychology as science had been built.
In the same year, James's former student and colleague, Ralph Barton Perry  added fuel to the fire. Perry had received his Ph.D. from Harvard in 1899 and after three years on the faculties of Williams and Smith Colleges, returned to Harvard in 1902, retiring in 1946 as a world renowned philosopher and the chief living authority on the life and work of William James. Within two years of his return to Harvard, Perry published "Conceptions and Misconceptions of Consciousness."  Where James had attacked consciousness as substance, Perry demolished consciousness as concept:
"How can a term mean anything when it is employed to connote anything and everything, including its own negation? One hears of the object of consciousness and subject of consciousness, and the union of the two in self-consciousness; of the private consciousness, the social consciousness, and the transcendental consciousness; the inner and the outer, the higher and the lower, the temporal and the eternal consciousness; the activity and the state of consciousness. Then there is consciousness-stuff, and unconscious consciousness, called respectively mind-stuff for short, and unconscious psychical states or subconsciousness to avoid a verbal contradiction. This list is not complete, but sufficiently amazing. Consciousness comprises everything that is, and indefinitely much more."
Psychologists must have been deeply concerned. If theirs was the science of consciousness, it was, on this account, the science of "everything that is, and indefinitely much more." In the face of such chaos, one might be tempted to leave the question of the nature of consciousness in abeyance and attempt instead to identify objective criteria by which consciousness might be attributed to other minds. This was, in essence, the approach taken by Robert Yerkes in his 1905 paper "Animal Psychology and the Criteria of the Psychic."
Distinguishing between the philosopher's concern with the question "must it be true?" and the natural scientist's pragmatic question "does it work?", Yerkes presented three structural (general morphology, neural organization, neural specialization) and three functional (discrimination, modifiability of reaction, variability of reaction) criteria that psychologists might treat as "physical signs of mind" and use for the purpose of making cross-species comparisons. This was only a short step away from the realization that "physical signs" could be used for cross-species comparison whether or not they related to consciousness -- a step that Watson was soon to take.
Although Yerkes had attempted to retreat from the question of what is consciousness, others continued to struggle with issues of definition. In 1906, John Dewey published "The Terms 'Conscious' and 'Consciousness,'"  and in 1908, Boyd Henry Bode (1873-1953) followed with "Some Recent Definitions of 'Consciousness." At the time, Dewey was at Columbia and Bode was on the faculty in philosophy at the University of Wisconsin, a position he left in 1909 for the University of Illinois and eventually Ohio State where he spent the remainder of his career working out a functional theory of consciousness.
The Dewey and the Bode papers were both attempts to bring some degree of order and clarity into the definitional chaos surrounding the concept of "consciousness." Given the central importance of consciousness for both psychology and philosophy, this was much more than an exercise in semantics. As Dewey put it, "I hardly think that anyone who is aware of the ambiguous senses in which the term consciousness is habitually used in philosophical discussions and of the misunderstandings that result, possibly of oneself and certainly of others, will regard the foregoing as a merely linguistic contribution." Unfortunately, one has only to read these two papers to realize just how deep the ambiguity ran.
By 1910, things were beginning to come to a head. Concern over the future of a psychology of "who knew what" was reaching a critical point. Construed from the perspective of a rapidly growing functionalism, the problem of defining consciousness had become the problem of demonstrating a role for consciousness. Three important papers from this period, one by Charles Hubbard Judd (1873-1946),  one by Henry Heath Bawden (b. 1871),  and the last by Eliott Park Frost (1884-1926), illustrate the extent to which this role was increasingly construed in terms of the regulation of behavior and development. As Judd phrased it in the opening lines of his paper "Evolution and Consciousness:"
There is no problem of present-day science of more vital importance to the psychologist than the problem of determining the relation of consciousness to the general process of organic evolution. This problem touches the very existence of psychology. The physiologists and the biologists have long been contending that they can give an adequate scientific account of human life without using the term consciousness or any of its synonyms, and their contentions will become convincing unless satisfactory evidences are speedily adduced to show that consciousness is not a mere by-product of organic adaptation."
In 1910 Judd had just moved from a professorship of psychology at Yale to the Directorship of the School of Education at the University of Chicago. Although he had been trained at Leipzig under Wundt, by the time he reached Chicago Judd had become a thoroughgoing functionalist and his approach to the analysis of the regulatory role of consciousness was evolutionary. Pointing to the fact that evolution had involved progress toward greater complexity, Judd argued that increasing complexity had in turn allowed organisms progressively greater self-sufficiency and therefore adaptability to a wider range of environments. In the course of evolution, he suggested, consciousness had emerged as an inner world whose function is to promote "self-sufficiency by literally taking up the environment into the individual and there remoulding the absorbed environment in conformity to individual needs."  In the most extreme case -- that of the human being -- the evolution of consciousness had led through tool use and language not just to autonomy but to the organism's actually establishing a functional level of control over the environment.
In another paper of 1910, "Mind as a Category of Science," H. Heath Bawden, an itinerant philosopher, had taken a related but somewhat different approach to the regulatory function of consciousness. Pointing out that scientists working within the realms of child, animal, and social psychology had "come gradually to look upon mental phenomena from a fresh angle...in terms of muscle and movement; changes in time and space; cošrdinations of leg and wing; response, behavior, physiological activity of some sort," Bawden argued that "this change in the procedure of psychological science presupposes a new conception of the nature of mind."
In Bawden's view, "the fundamental mark of all mental process...is the substitution of a part-process for the whole activity." Consciousness, in other words, was simply:
"vicarious response...an abortive or anticipative doing...All psychology, whether of the adult or child, whether individual or social, human or animal, has this common problem: What is the soul in terms of hands and feet, what is mind in terms of motor process?...The alleged uniqueness of the so-called introspective method is a figment...Adult introspective psychology is as truly study of behavior and motor process as biology or comparative psychology. The only difference is in the richness or remoteness of the data." 
Finally, in 1912, in still another attempt to articulate the regulatory role of consciousness, E.P. Frost, an instructor in psychology at Yale, asked "Can Biology and Physiology Dispense with Consciousness?" Blaming the tendency among biologists to ignore the role of consciousness on the failure of psychologists to clarify the nature of consciousness, Frost asserted that "consciousness is a process in precisely the same sense that osmosis or alimentation is a process." Coining the unwieldy term "consciousizing" to replace the substantive "consciousness" and couching his analysis in terms of energy, stimulation, and behavior, Frost once again stressed the regulatory function of consciousness:
"By a consciousizing process we shall mean not any sort of immediate reflection upon the inner life of process and change, but that process and change itself in so far as it involves a reference to the past experience of the animal, and a modification of otherwise rigid behavior in terms of that experience...(While) behavior can be everywhere explained without invoking conscious selves...neither biology nor physiology can dispense with consciousizing processes which are as real and as universal as are growth, or development, or evolutional processes...Energy is stored in some modified fashion by past experience; it is put in action by the stimulus now affecting the organism; its result is to modify the machinery of behavior in terms of that past experience. This is what and this is all that psychology can mean by conscious processes."
Psychologists may not yet have been ready in 1913 to fall in line behind the banner of Watsonian behaviorism, but whatever reluctance they felt could not have been due to lack of intellectual preparation. Views like those espoused by Judd, Bawden, and Frost were only barely removed from those that Watson would embody in his famous manifesto. Once consciousness has been reduced to a mechanism for the regulation of behavior, it was behavior, not consciousness, that would become the subject matter of the science. Not surprisingly, these changes in the conception of consciousness were almost precisely paralleled by attacks on introspection as method.
The Critique of Introspection
Just as James triggered the attack on consciousness, he also initiated the critique of introspection, although he did so much earlier than 1904. In one of the most influential papers in the history of psychology, "On Some Omissions of Introspective Psychology"  published in the journal Mind in 1884, James employed his famous concept of the "stream of consciousness" to exemplify the illusory quality of introspection:
"Immense tracts of our inner life are habitually overlooked and falsified...When we take a rapid general view of the wonderful stream of our consciousness...our mental life...seems to be made of an alternation of flights and perchings...resting places ("substantive parts")...usually occupied by sensorial imaginations of some sort, whose peculiarity is that they can be held before the mind for an indefinite time, and contemplated without changing; (and)...thoughts of relations ("transitive parts")...that for the most part obtain between the matters contemplated in the periods of comparative rest.
"The first difficulty of introspection is that of seeing the transitive parts for what they really are...flights to a conclusion, stopping them to look at them before the conclusion is reached is really annihilating them. Whilst if we wait till the conclusion be reached, it so exceeds them in vigour and stability that it quite eclipses and swallows them up in its glare. Let anyone try to cut a thought across in the middle and get a look at its section, and he will see how difficult the observation of the transitive tract is. The rush of thought is so headlong that it almost always brings us up at the conclusion before we can arrest it. Or...if we do arrest it, it ceases forthwith to be itself...The attempt at introspective analysis in these cases is in fact like seizing a spinning top to catch its motion..."
This analysis alone should have convinced psychologists of the futility of attempting to study the flow of consciousness in introspection. Had it been published and read as a critique of introspection after 1904, it might have done so. By the turn of the century, however, James's famous views had been incorporated in the "Stream of Thought" chapter in his Principles of Psychology, and they were read more as an account of the nature of consciousness than as an indictment of introspective method.
One of the first to address the nature of introspection within the period of interest was Walter Bowers Pillsbury (1872-1960).  Pillsbury received his Ph.D. at Cornell in 1896 under Titchener, and from 1897 until his retirement in 1942 served as a professor of psychology on the faculty of the University of Michigan. As a student of Titchener, for whom psychology involved the analysis of conscious content, Pillsbury saw in the new theories of consciousness an opportunity to defend introspection against traditional criticism:
In "A Suggestion Toward a Reinterpretation of Introspection," Pillsbury noted that the theory of introspection had yet to be revised in view of psychologists' increasing tendency to view consciousness as experience which in itself is neither subjective nor objective:
"From the newer conception we can no longer dismiss introspection with the statement that it is the peculiar method of psychology, or be satisfied with the statement that it is by introspection alone we can turn our gaze inward upon the mental states with which psychology deals. The philosophers of experience regard both mental fact and physical fact as parts of the single datum, so that whatever observation goes on must be directed toward the same general kind of material...A careful observation of the actual processes involved in introspection convinces the writer that what does distinguish it from observation is simply the attitude of mind at the time the two processes run their course...When we regard a given experience objectively, the question in mind...is as to what the object may be in itself or in relation to other objects. When we introspect, ...we ask what the experience means to us and what its relations may be to other mental processes. Exactly the same experience may, and usually does, furnish the starting point of both. 
On the basis of this analysis, Pillsbury pointed out that "introspection differs from observation only in the attitude of mind as we examine the mental process,...we can not introspect a process during its passage merely because we can not have two different attitudes of mind at once." This, he suggested, is as true of observation as it is of introspection; there is, therefore, "no more reason to assume that the results of this post-mortem examination are erroneous than to assume that all observation is misleading."
What Pillsbury may not have realized is that this analysis cut two ways. If introspection was not thought to differ in principle from observation, then all of the canons of adequacy applied to introspection as they did to observation. One of the first to make this explicit was Raymond Dodge (1871-1942) in a paper, "The Theory and Limitations of Introspection," published in 1912. Trained under Benno Erdmann (1851-1921) at Halle, Dodge taught at Wesleyan from 1898 to 1924, when he joined the Institute of Psychology at Yale, remaining there until his retirement in 1936.
Starting from precisely the same assumption regarding consciousness as experience as had Pillsbury, Dodge arrived at a radically different conclusion. Observation and introspection, he asserted, are both determined in part by the observer's available apperceptive systems. Good introspectors, like good behavioral observers, are not born; they are made. The must be trained, and training varies. For this reason both are liable to error. An adequate theory of introspection, he suggested, should be able to pinpoint the sources of error and specify the limitations of introspection. It should, in short, be able to "indicate the origin of those disturbing individual differences in introspection that more than any other one factor prevent us from speaking of a science of introspective psychology."
Dodge then proceeded to sketch out such a theory. One source of error, he noted, is the subconscious. Introspection is barred from informing us as to the nature of the subconscious and, hence, from giving us information concerning the real elements of consciousness. "The stuff of which consciousness is composed, must forever be inaccessible to introspection, since in introspection we can only find completed consciousness." Furthermore, introspection is unable to disclose either the apperceptive mass itself or the processes of apperception. In short, Dodge concluded, "the methodological dogma that all mental reality is subjectively observable and conversely that the subjectively observable alone is mental reality seems to me utterly unjustifiable." At most introspection is only one of several indicators of mental life. Equally important is "every pathological or neurological fact, every result of practice, training or fatigue that throws any light on mental capacity, mental organization, or mental defects." 
In the same year, Knight Dunlap (1875-1949) took the argument to its logical conclusion in an article appropriately entitled "The Case Against Introspection." At the time, Dunlap was a colleague of John B. Watson at Hopkins, and, as Watson himself once indicated, Dunlap exerted considerable influence during the period in which Watson was formulating his manifesto. In 1936, Dunlap left Hopkins to chair the Psychology Department at the University of California at Los Angeles and he remained there until his retirement in 1946.
After reviewing the many different uses of the terms "consciousness" and "introspection", Dunlap flatly denied the possibility that one can be aware of awareness and thereby, in his view, deprived the theory of introspection of its logical foundation. Psychologists have been fooled, he suggested, into thinking that they can observe the process of observing by the fact that experience of a given focal object is always accompanied by peripheral muscular and visceral sensations, images, and feelings that are connected with the activity of observation. These can be observed, but they are just as objective as the focal object itself. They are not consciousness. In concluding, Dunlap gave voice to a view that would shortly be taken up again by Watson:
"There is, as a matter of fact, not the slightest evidence for the reality of 'introspection' as the observation of 'consciousness.' Hence we must, in default of such evidence, cease the empty assumption of such a process...In view of the word's quite disreputable past it is probably better to banish it for the present from psychological usage.
Thus, in 1913, psychology ought to have been ready for Watson. The concepts of "consciousness" and "introspection" had long been under heavy attack, consciousness had been reduced by some to little more than a mechanism for the regulation of behavior, introspection would be banned by others. Psychology as the science of consciousness studied through introspection was in deep trouble. The record shows, however, that psychology was not yet ready for Watson. That this was so was evident in the earliest published reactions to Watson's views.
The Immediate Reception of Watson's Call for "Revolution"
As Samelson has so beautifully documented, the immediate reaction to Watson was muted. In "Behavior as a Category of Psychology," an important paper in its own right, James R. Angell devoted only a footnote to Watson, regretting:
"that Professor Watson's brilliant article pleading for the discarding of all subjective method in psychology...had not come to hand before this paper was written...In general I should recognize cordially the service rendered by so courageous and lucid a statement of creed, although a part of the program seems to me rather Utopian and impracticable and other portions appear to disregard somewhat obvious distinctions and difficulties. Meantime,...I am heartily sympathetic to most of the author's constructive, positive program for emphasizing objective methods in psychology.
The first direct response to Watson was a short discussion by Mary Whiton Calkins, "Psychology and the Behaviorist," that appeared in the Psychological Bulletin in 1913. Calkins primary objection was to Watson's unqualified rejection of introspection. Acknowledging the problems with introspective method to which Watson pointed, Calkins rejected as unjustified Watson's argument "from the divergence in introspective results that a psychology of organic adjustments should forthwith displace psychology as a science of consciousness." There were, she insisted, certain kinds of psychological processes that could only be studied by introspection, concluding not surprisingly, given her own status as a self-psychologist, that psychology needed to be the science of conscious self.
In 1914, three articles of interest appeared. The first, "Psychology as a Science of Behavior," by Boyd Bode, was largely a response to Angell and only secondarily to Watson. Early in his paper, Bode summed up the overall state of affairs rather nicely: "the upshot of the matter seems to be, on the one hand, that behaviorism, while incontestably scientific, is not exactly psychology, and on the other hand, that the study of 'subjective facts' or 'mental states,' while it may be entitled to the name of psychology, is neither scientific nor descriptive."
Agreeing with Watson that psychology should be considered as the study of behavior, Bode then reinterpreted behavior in typically functionalist terms. Certain behavior is instinctive, other behavior is regulated by consciousness. By emphasizing the distinction between purely automatic and conscious acts, he argued, "we are in a position to accept the contention that psychology is a science which has to do with behavior...and at the same time we guard against the danger of taking behavior in a sense which permits the distinctive and significant trait of conscious behavior to disappear from view."
The second paper of 1914, "Images and Ideas," was published by Watson's colleague Knight Dunlap. It too is generally functionalist rather than behaviorist in orientation. Possibly a bit stung by the proprietary nature of Watson's attack on the mental image, Dunlap opened his paper with a veiled priority claim to the effect that for several years he had been telling his students that "the conventional doctrine of 'mental images' is...largely fiction."  He then outlined his own theory of the mental image and, indeed, of thought more broadly construed.
Criticizing Watson's reduction of thought to muscular activity, Dunlap argued instead "that for psychology thought is thought, and the muscular activity is its essential condition." Eschewing Watson's total rejection of introspection, Dunlap concluded by pointing out that a limited form of introspection -- direct observation of the muscle sense -- provided by far "the most valuable observation of muscular activity," and hence indirectly a window into thought.
The most detailed and extensive reaction to Watson's paper in 1914 was "On 'Psychology as the Behaviorist Views It," read to the American Philosophical Society in April by Edward Bradford Titchener, arch structuralist and long-time opponent of functionalism. Commenting on what, he supposed, "we must be content to call behaviorism," Titchener summarized Watson's views:
"This doctrine...has two sides, positive and negative. On the positive side, psychology is required to exchange its individualistic standpoint for the universalistic; it is to be 'a purely objective experimental branch of natural science'...The changes which it studies are to be approached from the point of view of adjustment to environment; its categories are stimulus and response, heredity and habit...The erection of this special science is both justified and made possible by the practical goal of behaviorism, which is the working out of general and special methods for the control of behavior...One the negative side,...psychology is enjoined by the behaviorist to ignore, even if it does not deny, those modes of human experience with which ordinary psychology is concerned, and in particular to reject the psychological method of introspection. 'Consciousness in a psychological sense' may be dispensed with...Imagery...is denied outright..."
On logical and historical grounds, Titchener then summarily dismissed these views -- not as wrong -- but as irrelevant "to psychology as ordinarily understood." Appraising Watson's proposal as a whole, Titchener relegated it to the domain not of science but of mere technology:
"Watson is asking us, in effect, to exchange a science for a technology...behaviorism can never replace psychology because the scientific standpoints of the two disciplines are different; we now see that Watson's behaviorism can never replace psychology because the one is technological, the other scientific...Introspective psychology...will go quietly about its task, wishing the new movement all success, but declining -- with the mild persistence natural to matters of fact -- either to be eliminated or ignored." 
Finally, in 1915, John Dewey, one of Watson's own early teachers and at the time probably the leading philosophical proponent of a functionalist approach within psychology, offered still another and similar assessment of behaviorism. Reflecting on the relationship between psychological doctrine and philosophical teaching in a paper by the same title, Dewey wondered aloud what changes "will come over the spirit and tenor of philosophic discussion if the activities and methods of behaviorist psychologists grow at the expense of the introspectionist school."  Identifying himself implicitly as a "well-wisher (from the philosophic side), to the behaviorist movement," Dewey attempted to coopt behaviorism by broadening the definition of behavior:
"Behavior, taken in its own terms...would seem to be as wide as the doings and sufferings of a human being. The distinction between routine and whimsical and intelligent -- or aimful -- behavior would seem to describe a genuine distinction in ways of behaving. To throw overboard "consciousness" as a realm of existences immediately given as private and open only to private inspection (or introspection) is one thing; to deny...the genuineness of the difference between conscious (or deliberate) behavior and impulsive and routine behavior is another thing..." 
Dewey, like Calkins, Bode, and Dunlap before him, had adopted a strategy of accepting the notion of behavior and then adapting it to serve his own ends. As Samelson  has pointed out, this strategy of cooptation was common among early reactions to behaviorism. At the same time, however, Dewey's need to employ such a strategy and the language in which it was employed also make it clear just how successful Watson had already been. There was, as we have indicated, no revolution. Watson did not yet have an army of behaviorists; but Calkins referred to "the behaviorist," Calkins, Bode, Dunlap, Dewey and Titchener to "behaviorism," and Dewey to "the behaviorist movement." Watson had achieved a critical end. He had formulated a perspective, given it a name, and convinced his colleagues that it was a movement.
1. The author would like to express his gratitude for invaluable editorial assistance provided by Berit I. Haahr and Jana M. Iverson. . [Back to text]
2. For biographical material on Watson, see: Buckley, K.W. (1989). Mechanical man: John Broadus Watson and the beginnings of behaviorism. NY: Guilford Press. [Back to text]
3. Watson, J.B. (1913a). Psychology as the behaviorist views it. Psychological Review, 20, 158-177. [Back to text]
4. Ibid., p. 158. [Back to text]
5. Watson, J.B. (1914). Behavior: A textbook of comparative psychology. New York: Henry Holt & Co. [Back to text]
6. Herrnstein, R.J. & Boring, E.G. (1966). A sourcebook in the history of psychology. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. See especially p. 507. [Back to text]
7. Watson (1913a), pp. 163-164. [Back to text]
8. Watson, J.B. (1913b). Image and affection in behavior. The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods, 10, 421-428. This lecture was given at Columbia on 3 April 1913. [Back to text]
9. Ibid., pp. 421-424. [Back to text]
10. At various times, Watson edited the Psychological Review , Psychological Bulletin, Psychological Monographs, Behavior Monographs, and the Journal of Experimental Psychology. [Back to text]
11. Watson, J.B. (1924/1925). Behaviorism. New York: People's Institute Publishing Company; Watson, J.B. (1928). The ways of behaviorism. New York: Harper & Brothers; Watson, J.B. & McDougall, W. (1928). The battle of behaviorism. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co. [Back to text]
12. Watson, J.B. (1936). John Broadus Watson. In C. Murchison (Ed). A history of psychology in autobiography. Worcester, MA: Clark University Press, pp. 271-281. [Back to text]
13. Perry, R.B. (1904). Conceptions and misconceptions of consciousness. Psychological Review, 11, 282-296, p. 282. [Back to text]
14. Samelson, F. (1981). Struggle for scientific authority: The reception of Watson's behaviorism, 1913-1920. Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences, 17, 399-425, p. 399. This carefully researched and beautifully documented article is the definitive source of information on the early reception of Watson's behaviorism. [Back to text]
15. Cattell, J. McK. (1906). Conceptions and methods of psychology. In Rogers, H.J. Congress of Arts and Science, Universal Exposition, St. Louis, 1904. Volume V. Biology, Anthropology, Psychology, Sociology. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin & Co. pp. 593-604. [Back to text]
16. For biographical material on Cattell, see: Woodworth, R.S. (1944). James McKeen Cattell, 1860-1944. Psychological Review, 51, 1-10; and Gates, A.I. (1968). Cattell, James McKeen. In D.L. Sills (Ed). International encyclopedia of the social sciences. NY: Macmillan. pp. 344-346. [Back to text]
17. Cattell (1906), p. 594. [Back to text]
18. Ibid., p. 597. [Back to text]
19. See See Wozniak, R.H. (1993). John B. Watson, behaviorism, and Behavior: An Introduction to Comparative Psychology. In Watson, J.B. (1993). Behavior: An Introduction to Comparative Psychology. London: Routledge/Thoemmes. (reprint of the 1914 edition). [Back to text]
20. For biographical material on Angell, see: Hunter, W.S. (1949). James Rowland Angell, 1869-1949. American Journal of Psychology, 62, 439-450. [Back to text]
21. Angell, J.R. (1907). The province of functional psychology. Psychological Review, 14, 61-91. [Back to text]
22. James, W. (1884). On some omissions of introspective psychology. Mind, 9, 1-26. [Back to text]
23. Darwin, C. (1859). On the origin of the species by means of natural selection, or, The preservation of favoured races in the struggle for life. London: John Murray. [Back to text]
24. Angell (1907), pp. 61-68. [Back to text]
25. Kirkpatrick, E.A (1907). A broader basis for psychology necessary. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods, 4, 542-546. [Back to text]
26. For biographical material on Kirkpatrick, see: Bolton, T.L. (1937). Edwin Asbury Kirkpatrick: 1862-1937. American Journal of Psychology, 49, 489. [Back to text]
27. Ibid., p. 543. [Back to text]
28. Ibid. [Back to text]
29. Ibid. [Back to text]
30. Ibid., p. 546. [Back to text]
31. Ibid. [Back to text]
32. For biographical material on Calkins, see: Furumoto, L. (1979). Mary Whiton Calkins (1863-1930): Fourteenth president of the American Psychological Association. Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences, 15, 346-356; and Furumoto, L. (1980). Mary Whiton Calkins (1863-1930). Psychology of Women Quarterly, 5, 55-68. For a discussion of the nature of her self-psychology, see: Strunk, O., Jr. (1972). The self-psychology of Mary Whiton Calkins. Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences, 8, 196-203. [Back to text]
33. Calkins, M.W. (1907). Psychology: What is it about? Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods, 4, 673-683. [Back to text]
34. Ibid., p. 676-677. [Back to text]
35. For biographical material on Yerkes, see: Carmichael, L. (1957). Robert Mearns Yerkes, 1876-1956. Psychological Review, 64, 1-7; and Hilgard, E.R. (1965). Robert Mearns Yerkes, May 26, 1876 -- February 3, 1956. Biographical Memoirs of the National Academy of Sciences, 38, 385-409. [Back to text]
36. Yerkes, R.M. (1910). Psychology in Its Relations to Biology. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods, 7, 113-124. [Back to text]
37. Ibid., p. 124. [Back to text]
38. James, W. (1904). Does 'consciousness' exist? Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods, 1, 477-491. [Back to text]
39. Yerkes, R.M. (1910), p. 118. [Back to text]
40. See Wozniak, R.H. (1993). Max Meyer and The Fundamental Laws of Human Behavior. In Meyer, M. (1993). The fundamental laws of human behavior. London: Routledge/Thoemmes. (reprint of the 1911 edition). [Back to text]
41. Meyer, M. (1911). The fundamental laws of human behavior. Boston: R.G. Badger. [Back to text]
42. Pillsbury, W.B. (1929). The history of psychology. NY: Norton, p. 290. [Back to text]
43. Meyer, M. (1911), p. 239. [Back to text]
44. Meyer, M. (1912). The present status of the problem of the relation between mind and body. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods, 9, 365-371. [Back to text]
45. Ibid., p. 371. [Back to text]
46. Available biographical information on Parmelee is extremely limited, see: Who Was Who in America, 7, 1977-1981. [Back to text]
47. Parmelee, M. (1913). The science of human behavior: Biological and psychological foundations. NY: Macmillan. [Back to text]
48. Ibid., p.1. [Back to text]
49. See Wozniak, R.H. (1993). Jacques Loeb, comparative physiology of the brain, and comparative psychology. In Loeb, J. (1993). Comparative Physiology of the Brain and Comparative Psychology. London: Routledge Thoemmes. (reprint of the 1901 London edition). [Back to text]
50Wells, F.L. (1913). [Review of] The Science of Human Behavior...Psychological Bulletin, 10, 280-281, p. 280. . [Back to text]
51. James is so well known and the nature of his views so complex that no biographical information will be provided and no attempt will be made here to do more than indicate the general character of his argument as it influenced psychologists concernedwith the nature of consciousness. Although it has been superseded in certain ways by later biographical and critical work on James, the standard account is still: Perry, R.B. (1935). The thought and character of William James. Boston: Little, Brown, & Co. 2 volumes. [Back to text]
52. James, W. (1904). [Back to text]
53. Ibid., p. 477-478. [Back to text]
54. Ibid., p. 480. [Back to text]
55. For material on Perry, see: Robischon, T. (1967). Perry, Ralph Barton. In P. Edwards (Ed). The encyclopedia of philosophy. Volume 5. NY: Macmillan. pp. 93-95. [Back to text]
56. Perry (1904). [Back to text]
57. Ibid., p. 282. [Back to text]
58. Yerkes, R.M. (1905). Animal psychology and criteria of the psychic. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods, 2, 141-149. [Back to text]
59. Ibid., p. 144. [Back to text]
60. Dewey, like James, is too well known to require identification. Biographical material can be found in: Boring, E.G. (1953). John Dewey: 1859-1952. American Journal of Psychology, 66, 145-147. [Back to text]
61. Dewey, J. (1906). The terms 'conscious' and 'consciousness.' Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods, 3, 39-41. [Back to text]
62. For material on Bode's life and work, see: Roth, J.K. (1955). Bode, Boyd Henry. Dictionary of American Biography, Supplement Five, 1951-1955. NY: Scribner's Sons. pp. 71-72. [Back to text]
63. Bode, B.H. (1908). Some recent definitions of consciousness. Psychological Review, 15, 255-264. [Back to text]
64. Dewey (1906), p. 41. [Back to text]
65. For biographical material on Judd, see: Freeman, F.N. (1947). Charles Hubbard Judd, 1873-1946. Psychologial Review, 54, 59-65. [Back to text]
66. Material on the life of Bawden is not readily available. An extensive sea[Back to text]rch of standard biographical data bases did not turn up even a single relevant entry. [Back to text]
67. A brief biographical entry for Frost can be found in: Anon. (1931). The National Cyclopaedia of American Biography, Volume 21. NY: James T. White & Company. [Back to text]
68. Judd, C.H. (1910). Evolution and consciousness. Psychological Review, 17, 77-97. [Back to text]
69. Ibid., p. 77. [Back to text]
70. Ibid., p. 80. [Back to text]
71. Bawden, H.H. (1910). Mind as a category of science. Psychological Bulletin, 7, 221-225. [Back to text]
72. Ibid., p. 222. [Back to text]
73. Ibid. [Back to text]
74. Ibid., p. 223. [Back to text]
75. Ibid., p. 224-225. [Back to text]
76. Frost, E.P. (1912). Can biology and physiology dispense with consciousness? Psychological Review, 19, 246-252. [Back to text]
77. Ibid., p. 248. [Back to text]
78. Ibid., pp. 248-249, 251-252. [Back to text]
79. James, W. (1884). On some omissions of introspective psychology. Mind, 9, 1-26. Far more, of course, could be said about this remarkable article. Limitations of space, however, preclude more than the merest indication of its contents. Should the reader find him or herself in the unenviable position of being able to read but a single one of the papers gathered here, it should be this. [Back to text]
80. Ibid., pp. 2-3. [Back to text]
81. James, W. (1890). Principles of psychology. NY: Henry Holt. [Back to text]
82. For biographical material on Pillsbury, see: Dallenbach, K.M. (1961). Walter Bowers Pillsbury: 1872-1960. American Journal of Psychology, 74, 165-176.; and: Miles, W.R. (1964). Biographical Memoirs of the National Academy of Sciences, 37, 267-285. [Back to text]
83. Pillsbury, W.R. (1904). A suggestion toward a reinterpretation of introspection. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods, 1, 225-228. [Back to text]
84. Ibid., p. 225-226. [Back to text]
85. Ibid., p. 228. [Back to text]
86. Ibid. [Back to text]
87. For a discussion of Dodge's life and works, see: Woodworth, R.S. (1942). Raymond Dodge, 1871-1942. Psychological Review, 49, 395-402. [Back to text]
88. Dodge, R. (1912). The theory and limitations of introspection. American Journal of Psychology, 23, 214-229. [Back to text]
89. Ibid., p. 224. [Back to text]
90. Ibid., pp. 225-226. [Back to text]
91. Ibid., p. 227. [Back to text]
92. Ibid., p. 229. [Back to text]
93. For biographical material on Dunlap, see: Moore, K.G. (1949). Knight Dunlap, 1875-1949. Psychological Review, 56, 309-310; and Dorcus, R.M. (1950). Knight Dunlap: 1875-1949. American Journal of Psychology, 63, 114-119. [Back to text]
94. Dunlap, K. (1912). The case against introspection. Psychological Review, 19, 404-413. [Back to text]
95. Watson, J.B. (1936). John Broadus Watson. In C. Murchison (Ed). A history of psychology in autobiography. Worcester, MA: Clark University Press, pp. 271-281. [Back to text]
96. Dunlap (1912), p. 412. [Back to text]
97. Samelson (1981). [Back to text]
98. Angell, J.R. (1913). Behavior as a category of psychology. Psychological Review, 20, 255-270. [Back to text]
99. Ibid., p. 261. [Back to text]
100. Calkins, M.W. (1913). Psychology and the behaviorist. Psychological Bulletin, 10, 288-291. [Back to text]
101Ibid., p. 288. . [Back to text]
102. Bode, B.H. (1914). Psychology as a science of behavior. Psychological Review, 21, 46-61. [Back to text]
103. Ibid., p. 51. [Back to text]
104. Ibid., p. 59. [Back to text]
105. Dunlap, K. (1914). Images and ideas. Johns Hopkins University Circular, Whole Number 263, 25-41. [Back to text]
106. Ibid., p. 25. [Back to text]
107. Ibid., p. 40. [Back to text]
108. Ibid. [Back to text]
109. Titchener, E.B. (1914). On "psychology as the behaviorist views it". Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, 53, 1-17. [Back to text]
110. Ibid., p. 2. [Back to text]
111. Ibid., pp. 2-3. [Back to text]
112. Ibid., p. 4. [Back to text]
113. Ibid., pp. 14, 17. [Back to text]
114. Dewey, J. (1914). Psychological doctrine and philosophical teaching. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods, 11, 505-511. [Back to text]
115. Ibid., p. 509. [Back to text]
116. Ibid. [Back to text]
117. Ibid. [Back to text]
118. Samelson (1981), see especially p. 401. [Back to text]