2- I read Soss' 2 articles in reverse of Sandy's suggestion. I actually found this helpful in that it raised numerous questions for me regarding Soss' conclusions and methodology (see last question under 2), despite the fact that I "bought" his arguments and they seemed to me to have intuitive correctness.
a. Soss cites Putnam in his Bib. and alludes to some of his discussions of citizenship in the early part of the Welfare Provision paper. Putnam wrote an article called "Bowling Alone..." which I read several years ago. If I remember correctly, it's main point was that , as a society/culture, we are rapidly losing something he refered to as "social capital". By this, he seemed to mean what Soss quotes as "the world of ties that bind". The epitome was the loss of bowling leagues as representative of how disconnected we've become. He noted the pressure for time, the entrance of women into the workforce and increased technology (MAC means you don't even have to relate to bankers and pay at pump means even less necessity for human interaction) have all limited connections among people and limited time left over to devote to citizenship activities such as PTA, volunteerism, faith communities, bowling leagues etc. In light of readings, I tie these to the lack of time and organization for activism as well. How might this lack of time, free community labor, and connection, influence policy formation and social change?
b. How might the loss of social capital argument be bolstered by the findings of Soss, i.e. that we are losing a whole group of people who are being socialized by policy initiated programs (AFDC/TANF) to not partake of citizenship activities?
c. Soss repeats Marshall's evolution of citizenship and I saw it in a new way. The movement of civil>political>social citizenship mirrors Kohlberg's moral development scheme. ( Move from rule based "equal" justice to connection, norm-based justice, to social justice based on a moral sense of the dignity and worth of all people). What are the implications of this parallel ? How might this begin to inform our discussion of the meaning of social justice?
d. S&I indicate that the "justice oriented rationale" is the one most often used for programs for those who are dependent, such as women and children on AFDC/TANF. They are clear in the implication that this is not a very influential factor for implementing policy and note that instrumental rationales are much more effective. Reading the first part of Soss, I kept thinking of my old choir director who constantly noted that the choir was only as good as our weakest member. If "good citizens" (&/or social workers) promoted this idea within society- i.e. that we are only as strong as the weakest member of the US and that it is in everyone's interest to provide enough material goods and services to everyone (universality isssue) to ensure ample resources to enable full citizenship- what might occur? Might this instrumental rationale work?
d-i Taken another way, how many of us "do-gooders" harbor fears about the disenfranchised becoming empowered in ways that might rock our boats as well? Might these fears be what keeps our profession from fully embracing macro, social change work which might actually influence policy?
e. Going back to the developmental idea, if the Kohlberg analogy is
at all accurate, the fact that we're seemingly stuck at political citizenship
implies about latency aged development. Might this provide some explanation
of why our policy/ programs function to punish those who violate societal
expectations (pg 9) to uphold "majoritarian values" (9)? If so, does
this mean that until our societal development progresses to a more mature
level, we can't expect good citizenship to well up from within to promote
the collective good? (Not to add to the sense of hopelessness we've
commented on before!)
f. Methodology- In the second article "Lessons of Welfare", Soss
denies that there are differences in the SSDI and AFDC populations based
on gender. He draws the connections between sense of efficacy and
participation in the two differently administered programs and draws conclusions
about how these programs limit participation in the democratic process
and citizenship on broader community levels. I am persuaded by his
arguments, however I have questions about the fact that the SSDI sample
is nearly half male, while the AFDC sample is all female. Nelson raises
issues regarding gender somewhat differently, but they need to be addressed.
Females tend to be socialized not to make waves and not necessarily
to be very politically involved, while the opposite is true of males.
How might this have influenced Soss' findings?
g. Reading both Soss articles in conjuction with S&I might lead one to wonder about trying to begin shaping public policy by re shaping social constructions, a strategy which might involve use of the media to put a human face on recipients. How might Soss' finding that recipients tend to differentiate themselves from the group not only block collective action, but also minimize the effectiveness of this intervention?
h. While in the intervention mode, what might happen if a relatively
small change, such as requiring caseworkers to ensure that as each family
member turns 18, that they provide voter registration materials, and further,
provide voting site information to all clients during the meeting prior
to any election, was implemented? Certainly, this does not remedy
the difficulty of paternalistic, arbitrary caseworkers, but it does put
empowering citizenship related materials into client's hands via the system.
(As an aside, when I took Cloward's class in the mid 80's, we all had
to pick a site and do voter registration. I went to an unemployment
site and an AFDC site [where we had to stay outside]. I didn't feel
that we were all that effective since we had no info. about where they
would go to actually vote, no assurance that they received their cards
eventually, and no ability to call and remind them to vote- much less any
real waY to convince them that their vote would count. Also,
it was so clear that the system rejected this intervention and that it
likely reinforced ideas of powerlessness instead of promoting empowerment.
Had registration come directly from the caseworker, with the expectation
that the client should "vote their conscience", would this begin to promote
citizenship activities, albeit in a paternalistic way, or even worse, send
the message that clients are not seen as a threat and be even more disempowering?)
3- Re: Nelson: There's a lot here to respond to as well. In light of how I've gone on at length already, let me limit to questioning how the change in norms for middle class women from expecting to stay home with young children (50's- early 70's) to expecting to work during this time effects the willingness of policy makers to provide this opportunity for AFDC recipients. The fact that "liberalism.... is .. confused by those claims when they are made in the name of motherhood" (p225, Nelson) is not at all surprising in light of the confusion surrounding motherhood over the last decades. (Again , an aside. I was privy to discussions between academics who visited my parents in the 60's - which is really not that long ago- there were serious discussions that women could never hold political power appropriately because "they're too emotional" and "might push the red button when they got their period"!!!!)
4- S& I I guess I should stop with this, but , to come full
circle, we're back to chicken/egg. S & I say "Policy is an important
variable that shapes citizenship orientations and perpetuates certain views
of citizenship that are in turn linked to differential p[articipation among
groups (p. ?- under"Who Participates", in Schneider & Ingram, top of
next column). This is certainly supported by Soss. I wonder if really
, capitalism affects social construction which THEN drives policy which
creates programs which become defining of participant's citizenship activities.
--------------------------------
Joe Soss responds:
1. The chicken and egg problem of political action and politics: I think
these comments are right on the mark. It is perhaps more difficult,
but almost certainly more fruitful to view this as a reciprocal relationship.
This is S&I's point in arguing that social constructions shape the
actions of policymakers and that policies, in turn, convey
cues to the citizenry. It is equally my point at the end of the
lessons of welfare article when I describe the process of politics being
reshaped by its own products. My work (and to some extent S&I's
work) focuses attention on the causal force of policy design. We both do
this, I suspect, to correct an overemphasis on policy as the final outcome
of the political process (as in many systems theories, pluralist theories,
and economic theories of democracy). My point is not to substitute one
unidirectional account for another, but rather to suggest a dialectic
process.
2. On Putnam: Again, these are some very good comments. The issue
raised here about how declining social capital (if indeed, it is declining)
might affect the policy process is an important one. Of the people
writing in this area, few have really addressed it very well. My
beef with Putnam focuses on two issues. First, in describing a societal
decline in social capital, Putnam ignores issues of conflict and distribution.
It is as if society is one big group, and we're all just less engaged.
From my perspective, the conflictual basis of politics means that it matters
at least as much *who* is engaged and *who* is not. And here, we confront
the massive fact that resource inequalities lead to disparities in civic
and political engagement. (It's also worth noting here a parallel with
the disagreement between marshall and piven
& cloward. Marshall describes a consensual society-wide evolution;
P&C focus on coflictual processes and the mobilization of particular
groups. Likewise Putnam focuses on broad patterns of societal evolution,
while I am directing more attention to particularistic patterns and political
conflict.) Second, in describing and even
explaining the decline in civic engagement, Putnam offers no theory
of how state institutions and public policies might come into play. Here,
we return to the chicken and egg problem discussed above. In Putnam's
account, levels of engagement seem to spring up and shape politics without
regard for institutional or policy context. Following some of Tarrow's
critiques, I suggest that this Civic Culture style analysis is incomplete.
To understand who is engaged and why, we need to consider
the actions of the state. In short, I think Putnam's analysis
pays too little attention to differences in levels of engagement and ignores
the role of the state in shaping those levels of engagement -- particularly
among the poor.
3. On the connection between Marhsall and Kohlberg's developmental schemes: I think there is some room for interesting discussion here. But I would be careful to guard against an interpretation of Marshall's social rights stage as somehow “post-conventional.” Kohlberg's suggestion that there is a "highest" stage of moral thinking and that it involves principled autonomy divorced from social norms strikes me as different from Marshall's suggestion that social rights developed as a shared norm (i.e., a convention employed for conventional moral thinking). That said, I do think that Marshall and Kohlberg both accept a somewhat Kantian view of what is just. So, drawing on Gilligan’s critique of Kohlberg, a revision of this question might ask, what are the implications of an ethic-of-care critique for Marshall’s analysis? (Joan Tronto’s work seems relevant here.)
4. On methodology and gender: This is a particularly important issue,
so let me see if I can clarify my position. First things first: gender
is an essential part of the story I’m telling here because it has shaped
the institutional designs that citizens encounter in welfare programs.
The causal factor in this analysis, policy design, reflects the
influence of gender (and race and class) in critical ways. On this
point is on the table, the question becomes not whether gender matters
for this analysis (it does), but whether (a) gender offers a rival explanation
that accounts for the policy effects I find or (b) there are gender differences
in the process I describe. The first is a question of analytic control,
the second is a question of interaction. My reading of the evidence
suggests that gender doesn't matter for this story in either of these two
particular ways. Why? Well, if the differences across programs in political
lessons and political efficacy merely reflected gender differences, we
would expect to see several things. First, men and women in a single program,
SSDI, should learn different lessons and develop different
views of government. I don’t find this pattern in my transcripts.
Second, if men are dropped from the analysis altogether, there should be
no discernible differences between women in AFDC and women in SSDI. I also
do not find this pattern. Third, in the statistical analyses, the
inclusion of gender in the model should cause the relationship between
program participation and efficacy to evaporate. It does not do so in either
model of efficacy. Women score significantly lower than men on internal
efficacy. But the relationship between program participation and efficacy
remains after accounting for this relationship. In addition, I don’t find
significant interactions between gender and program participation. Finally,
these findings are pretty consistent with other research on gender and
political learning/socialization. Women and men are routinely socialized
in
different way; but when they encounter a shared experience they tend
to learn similar lessons. …In sum, I think gender matters a great
deal for the construction of welfare policy designs, but I don’t find evidence
that gender shapes or obviates the relationship between program experience
and political learning.
5. On small changes: The suggestions here (voter registration in welfare
agencies and changes in media coverage) would, in my opinion, constitute
very significant forms of progress. The political learning process I describe
is grounded in symbolism. If agency procedures and actions take on
a symbolic value for recipients that shapes their understanding of how
they are viewed by government, then we need to focus on incorporating more
positive symbolic action. If a state fingerprints welfare applicants,
this is likely to equate welfare claiming with a criminal act. If
the applicant receives a voter registration card instead, I suspect that
this might go some small distance toward linking welfare claiming to citizenship.
Backed up by other changes, this might create a very different understanding
of what it means to be an AFDC
client. …On media coverage, I would argue that the tendency for AFDC
clients to estrange themselves from their fellow recipients is a protective
response to a stigmatized atmosphere. Alter this atmosphere (through changed
media coverage, political activism, or political leadership), and I suspect
that you will find less estrangement among recipients.
6. Toward the end of the comments, there is this: “I wonder if really , capitalism affects social construction which THEN drives policy which creates programs which become defining of participant's citizenship activities.” This strikes me as a helpful summary of the symbolic dimension of Piven & Cloward’s argument in Regulating the Poor. The stigma of welfare receipt, in this view, may be seen as functional for capitalism. The “social construction of target populations” (S&I) is grounded by Piven & Cloward in the prior system of capitalist relations. Poor relief, in this view, involves the construction and ritual degradation of a pariah class defined by their failure to accept the meanest work at the meanest wages. Perhaps. What do you think?
Thanks again for a wonderful set of comments. I would be happy to continue the dialogue if my responses raise more questions than they answer.