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| LACAN |
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Jacques Lacan
"I see only from one point, but in my existence I am looked at from all sides."
"Who then is this other to whom I am more attached than to myself, since, at the heart of my assent to my own identity it is still he who agitates me?
His presence can be understood only at a second degree of otherness, which already places him in the position of mediating between me and the double of myself, as it were with my counterpart."
"You never look at me from the place from which I see you. Conversely, what I look at is never what I wish to see."
"…this Petit-Jean pointed out to me something floating on the surface of the waves. It was a small can, a sardine can. It floated there in the sun, a witness to the canning industry, which we, in fact, were supposed to supply. It glittered in the sun. And Petit-Jean said to me- You see that can? Do you see it? Well, it doesn't see you! "
"In the scopic field, everything is articulated between two terms that act in an antinomic way- on the side of things, there is the gaze, that is to say, things look at me, and yet I see them. This is how one should understand those words, so strongly stressed, in the Gospel, They have eyes that they might not see. That they might not see what? Precisely, that things are looking at them."
"Psychoanalysis involves the real of the body and the imaginary of its mental schema."
"One must never read Freud without one's ears cocked. When one reads such things, one really ought to prick up one's ears."
"It is in the nom du père that we must recognize the support of the symbolic function which, from the dawn of history, has identified his person with the figure of the law."
"So Oedipus does exist, and he fully realized his destiny. He realized it to that final point which is nothing more than something strictly identical to a striking down, a tearing apart, a laceration of himself- he is no longer, no longer anything, at all. And it is at that moment that he says the phrase I evoked last time- Am I made man in the hour when I cease to be?"
"In fact, it is when he was the butterfly that he [Choang-tsu] apprehended one of the roots of his identity- that he was, and is, in his essence, that butterfly who paints himself with his own colours- and it is because of this that, in the last resort, he is Choang-tsu.
This is proved by the fact that, when he is the butterfly, the idea does not occur to him to wonder whether, when he is Choang-tsu awake, he is not the butterfly that he is dreaming of being. This is because, when dreaming of being the butterfly, he will no doubt have to bear witness later that he represented himself as a butterfly. But this does not mean that he is captivated by the butterfly- he is a captive butterfly, but captured by nothing, for, in the dream, he is a butterfly for nobody. It is when he is awake that he is Choang-tsu for others, and is caught in their butterfly net."
"This picture is simply what any picture is, a trap for the gaze. In any picture, it is precisely in seeking the gaze in each of its points that you will see it disappear."
"The Freudian world isn't a world of things, it isn't a world of being, it is a world of desire as such."
"This paradoxical, unique, specified object we call the objet a. I have no wish to rehash the whole thing again, but I will present it for you in a more syncopated way, stressing that the analysand says to his partner, to the analyst, what amounts to this- I love you, but, because inexplicably I love in you something more than you- the object petit a- I mutilate you."
"The desire of man is constituted, he tells us, under the sign of mediation, it is the desire for the recognition of his desire."
"What is my desire? What is my position in the imaginary structuration? This position is only conceivable in so far as one finds a guide beyond the imaginary, on the level of the symbolic plane, of the legal exchange which can only be embodied in the verbal exchange between human beings."
"In this interval intersecting the signifiers, which forms part of the very structure of the signifier, is the locus of what, in other registers of my exposition, I have called metonymy. It is there that what we call desire crawls, slips, escapes, like the ferret. The desire of the Other is apprehended by the subject in that which does not work, in the lacks of the discourse of the Other, and all the child's whys reveal not so much an avidity for the reason of things, as a testing of the adult, a Why are you telling me this? ever-resuscitated from its base, which is the enigma of the adult's desire."
"Desire is a relation of being to lack. This lack is the lack of being properly speaking. It isn't the lack of this or that, but lack of being whereby the being exists."
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